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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the effect of (potential) market size on entry of new drugs and
pharmaceutical innovation. Focusing on exogenous changes driven by U.S. demographic trends, we
find that a 1 percent increase in the potential market size for a drug category leads to a 4 to 6 percent
increase in the number of new drugs in that category. This response comes from both the entry of
generic drugs and new non-generic drugs, and is generally robust to controlling for a variety of non-
profit factors, pre-existing trends, and changes in health care coverage.
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jlinn@mit.edu1 Introduction
This paper constructs a simple model linking innovation rates to current and future market
size, and provides evidence from the pharmaceutical industry to support this hypothesis. Our
empirical work, which exploits changes in the market size for various drug categories driven by
U.S. demographic trends, ﬁnds economically signiﬁcant and relatively robust eﬀects of market
size on entry of new drugs.
Although many historical accounts of important innovations focus on the autonomous
progress of science and on major breakthroughs that take place as scientists build on each
other’s work,1 economists typically emphasize proﬁti n c e n t i v e sa n dt h es i z eo ft h et a r g e tm a r -
ket. For example, in his seminal study, Invention and Economic Growth, Schmookler argued
that: “...invention is largely an economic activity which, like other economic activities, is pur-
sued for gain” (1966, p. 206). To emphasize the role of market size, Schmookler entitled two
of his chapters “The amount of invention is governed by the extent of the market.”
T h er o l eo fp r o ﬁt incentives and market size in innovation is also important both for the
recent endogenous technological change models, which make proﬁt incentives the central driving
force of the pace of aggregate technological progress (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992, Grossman
and Helpman, 1991, Romer, 1990), and for the induced innovation and directed technical
change literatures, which investigate the inﬂuence of proﬁt incentives on the types and biases
of new technologies (see, for example, Kennedy, 1964, Drandkis and Phelps, 1965, Samuelson,
1965, Hayami and Ruttan, 1970, and Acemoglu, 1998, 2002, and 2003). A recent series of
papers by Kremer, for example (2002), also build on the notion that pharmaceutical research
is driven by market size and argue that there is generally insuﬃcient research to develop cures
for third-world diseases such as malaria.
In this paper, we investigate the eﬀects of market size for diﬀerent types of drugs on entry
of new drugs and innovation. A major diﬃculty in any investigation of the impact of market
size on innovation is the endogeneity of market size–better products will have bigger markets.
Our strategy to overcome this problem is to exploit variations in market size driven by demo-
graphic changes (or past demographic trends), which should be exogenous to other, for example
scientiﬁc, determinants of innovation and entry of new drugs.2 We create the potential market
1See, for example, Ceruzzi (2000), Rosenberg (1974) and Scherer (1984). Ceruzzi emphasizes the importance
of a number of notable scientiﬁc discoveries and the role played by certain talented individuals in the development
of modern computing. He points out that important developments took place despite the belief of many
important ﬁgures in the development of the computer that there would not be a market greater than a handful
of personal computers in the United States (2000, p. 13).
2For many drugs non-U.S. markets may also be relevant. Nevertheless, the U.S. market is disproportionately
important, constituting about 40 percent of the world market (IMS, 2000). Below we also look at the impact
of West European and Japanese demographic changes on the entry rates of new drugs.
1size for various drug categories according to the age distribution of their users at a given point
in time, and then trace changes in potential market size driven by changes in demographics
(holding the age proﬁle of consumption of various drug categories constant over time).3 We
measure entry and innovation using the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) approval of
new drugs.4
Our results show that there is an economically and statistically signiﬁcant response of the
introduction of new drugs to market size. For example, a 1 percent increase in the size of the
p o t e n t i a lm a r k e tf o rad r u gl e a d st oa4t o6p e r c e n ti n c r e a s ei nt h en u m b e ro fn e wd r u g s .W e
check the robustness of our results by controlling for lagged FDA approvals, pre-existing trends,
diﬀerences in the non-economic incentives to innovate, advances in biotechnology and changes
in insurance coverage of drug expenditures. New drugs that enter the market comprise both
generics and non-generics, and we ﬁnd that both respond to market size, though the response
of generics is larger and somewhat more precisely estimated.
We also investigate whether it is the current market size or past or future market sizes
that have the largest eﬀect on entry of new drugs. On the one hand, because changes in
demographics are known in advance, drug entry may respond to anticipated future market
size. On the other hand, because the development process of new drugs can be long, entry
may respond to past market size. We ﬁnd that current market size and 5-10 year leads of
market size have the strongest eﬀect on entry rates of new drugs, which is consistent with the
predictions of the theoretical model we use to motivate our empirical investigation. Finally,
we also look at the response of pharmaceutical patents to market size, and ﬁnd a positive,
but statistically insigniﬁcant relationship between future anticipated market size and patents,
which might reﬂect the diﬃculty of matching patents to drug categories.
There are a number of other studies related to our work. First, Schmookler (1966) docu-
ments a statistical association between investments and sales, on the one hand, and patents and
innovation, on the other, and argues that the causality ran largely from the former to the latter.
The classic study by Griliches (1957) on the spread of hybrid seed corn in U.S. agriculture also
provides evidence consistent with the view that technological change and technology adoption
are closely linked to proﬁtability and market size. Pakes and Schankerman (1984) investigate
this issue using a more structural approach, linking R&D intensity at the industry level to
factor demands and to growth of output. In more recent research, Scott Morton (1999) and
3Loosely speaking, “market size” corresponds to the number of users times their marginal willingness to pay.
Therefore, market size can increase both because the number of users increases and because of their marginal
willingness to pay changes. We focus on changes driven by demographics to isolate exogenous changes in market
size.
4These data were previously used by Lichtenberg and Virahbak (2002), who obtained them under the Freedom
of Information Act. We thank Frank Lichtenberg for sharing these data with us.
2Reiﬀen and Ward (2002) study the decision of ﬁrms to introduce a new generic drug and ﬁnd
a positive relationship between entry into a new market and expected revenues in the target
market. None of these studies exploit a potentially exogenous source of variation in market
size, however.
Second, some recent research has investigated the response of innovation to changes in
energy prices. Most notably, Newell, Jaﬀee and Stavins (1999) show that between 1960 and
1980, the typical air-conditioner sold at Sears became signiﬁcantly cheaper, but not much more
energy-eﬃcient. On the other hand, between 1980 and 1990, there was little change in costs,
b u ta i r - c o n d i t i o n e r sb e c a m em u c hm o r ee n e r g y - e ﬃcient, which, they argue, was a response
to higher energy prices. In a related study, Popp (2002) ﬁnds a strong correlation between
aggregate patents and energy prices. These ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis that the
type of innovation responds to proﬁt incentives, though they do not establish causality.
Third, there is substantial research focusing on innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.
Henderson and Cockburn (1996), Cockburn and Henderson (2001), and Danzon, Nichelson and
Sousa Pereira (2003) study the determinants of success in clinical trials, focusing mainly on
ﬁrm and project size. Galambos and Sturchio (1998), Cockburn, Henderson and Stern (1999),
Gambardella (2000), and Malerba and Orsenigo (2000) discuss various aspects of the recent
technological developments in the pharmaceutical industry. Ling, Berndt and Frank (2003)
investigate the complementarity between new technologies and the skills of physicians in the
spread of new drugs.
Most closely related to this study are Lichtenberg and Waldfogel (2003) and Finkelstein
(2003). Lichtenberg and Waldfogel show that following the Orphan Drug Act there were larger
declines in mortality among individuals with rare diseases (compared to other diseases) because
of the incentives created by the Act to develop drugs for these rare diseases. Finkelstein exploits
three diﬀerent policy changes aﬀecting the reimbursement of costs of vaccination against 6
infectious diseases: the 1991 policy change that all infants be vaccinated against hepatitis B, the
1993 decision of Medicare to cover the costs of inﬂuenza vaccinations, and the 1986 introduction
of funds to insure vaccine manufactures against product liability lawsuits for vaccines against
polio, diphteria, tetanus, measles, mumps, rubella, or pertussis. She ﬁnds that increases in
vaccine proﬁtability resulting from these policy changes are associated with a signiﬁcant increase
in the number of clinical trials to develop new vaccines against the relevant diseases.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We outline a simple model linking innovation
to market size in the next section. Section 3 brieﬂy explains our empirical strategy, and Section
5Lichtenberg (2003) also presents evidence suggesting that the types of new drugs changed towards drugs
more useful for the elderly after Medicare was established.
34 describes the basic data sources and the construction of the key variables. Section 5 presents
the empirical results and a variety of robustness checks. Section 6 contains some concluding
remarks, while the Appendix gives further data details.
2T h e o r y
We now outline a simple framework to analyze the inﬂuence of market size on innovation.
Subsection 2.1 discusses the basic model. Subsection 2.2 derives the implications of potential
delays in the development and approval processes of new drugs. Subsection 2.3 generalizes the
basic model to investigate the response of innovation eﬀort and R&D to anticipated changes in
future market size. Finally subsection 2.4 extends the model to introduce an explicit distinction
between entry of generic drugs and non-generic drugs.
2.1 Basic Model
Consider an economy consisting of a set I individuals, each denoted by i.T i m ei sc o n t i n u o u s
t ∈ [0,∞), and all individuals are inﬁnitely lived. There are two types of goods in this economy.
First, a basic good, y, which can be consumed or used for the production of other goods, or
for research expenditure. Individual i has an exogenously given endowment yi (t) at time t.
Second, there is a large number J of drugs, x1, ...., xJ. Each drug has a potentially time-
varying “quality”, q1 (t), ...., qJ (t). Each individual demands only one type of drug. Hence, we
partition the set I of individuals into J disjoint groups, G1,...,GJ with G1 ∪ G2 ∪ ... ∪ GJ = I,
such that if i ∈ Gj, then individual i demands drug j.M o r e s p e c i ﬁcally, if i ∈ Gj,t h e nh i s









where r is the discount rate of the consumers (also the interest rate in the economy), γ ∈ (0,1),
ci (t) is the consumption of individual i of the basic good at time t,a n dxji(t) is the consumption
of individual i of drug j.6 This Cobb-Douglas functional form, which implies an elasticity
of substitution equal to 1 between the basic good and drugs, and the assumption that each





where ω(t,qj (t)xji(t)) is the discount rate, which is inﬂuenced by the quality and quantity of drugs that the
individual consumes (e.g., because they extend his life or aﬀect its quality). If we assume that ω(t,qj (t)xji(t)) =
rt− γ ln(qj (t)xji(t)), we obtain the expression in (1) in the text.
4individual only consumes one type of drug are for simplicity and do not aﬀect the main results.7
Normalizing the price of the basic good to 1 in all periods, and denoting the price of drug
j at time t by pj (t), individual demands for drugs are given by
xij (t)=
½ γyi(t)
pj(t) for i ∈ Gj
0 for i/ ∈ Gj,
(2)
for all i ∈ I and for all j =1 ,...,J.
At any point in time, there is one ﬁrm with the best-practice technology for producing each
type of drug. The best-practice ﬁrm in drug line j can produce one unit of drug with quality
qj (t) using one unit of the basic good. If there is an innovation for drug line j currently with
quality qj (t), this leads to the discovery of a new drug of quality λqj (t) where λ>1.F o r
the purposes of the model, we think that any new innovation is approved (for example by the
FDA) and can be sold to consumers immediately (and is under patent protection indeﬁnitely).
We start with a very simple formulation of the R&D technology whereby one unit of the
ﬁnal good devoted to R&D for drug line j leads to a ﬂow rate of δj > 0 of discovering a new
drug of this type. Equivalently, if total R&D eﬀo r ta tt i m et is zj (t),t h eﬂow rate of innovation
(the rate of entry of new drugs) for this line of drugs is
nj (t)=δjzj (t). (3)
Diﬀerences in δj’s introduce the possibility that technological progress is scientiﬁcally more
diﬃcult in some lines than others, which is the eﬀect emphasized by science-driven theories of
innovation discussed in the Introduction.
The most important feature of this R&D technology for our focus here is that technological
progress is directed in the sense that ﬁrms can devote their research eﬀort and expenditure to
developing particular types of drugs. This contrasts with a diﬀerent model where ﬁrms invest
in R&D in an undirected way, and discover new versions of any one of a set of drugs. The
pharmaceutical industry, especially in recent past, is a prime example of an industry where
companies with fairly sophisticated R&D divisions or specialized R&D ﬁrms can undertake
research for speciﬁc drug lines (e.g., Gambardella, 2000, Malerba and Orsenigo, 2000).8
7One implication of the Cobb-Douglas functional form is that the share of income that an individual spends
on medicine is constant. This implication can be easily relaxed by considering a utility function with an elasticity
of substitution diﬀerent from 1, as in the factor market models with directed technical change (see, for example,
Acemoglu, 1998, 2002).
It is also straightforward to extend the model so that each individual demands potentially more than one
type of drug, though this would require additional notation.
8Naturally, there exist examples of research directed at a speciﬁc drug type leading to the discovery of a
diﬀerent product, such as the well-known example of Viagra, which resulted from research on hypertension and
angina, and was partly accidentally discovered from the detection of side eﬀects in a clinical study (see, e.g.,
Kling, 1998).
5The demand curves in (2) have an elasticity equal to 1, so an unconstrained monopolist
would like to charge an arbitrarily high price. However, the ﬁrm with the best drug in line
j is competing with the next best drug in that line. Consider such a ﬁrm with quality qj (t)
charging price pj (t). If this price is arbitrarily high, the next best quality could supply to the
market and make positive proﬁts, driving the best technology to zero proﬁts. Therefore, the
ﬁrm with the best drug has to set a limit p r i c et oe x c l u d et h en e x tb e s tﬁrm–i.e., to ensure
that consumers are happy to buy from it rather than buy from the next best ﬁrm even if the
next best ﬁrm charges the lowest possible price, i.e., equal to its marginal cost, 1. Suppose that
a consumer buys from the best ﬁrm with quality qj (t) and price pj (t) and chooses her optimal
consumption as given by (2), then her instantaneous utility at time t will be:
(qj (t))




and if she purchases from the next best ﬁrm, which, by deﬁnition, has quality qj (t)/λ and
charges price equal to marginal cost, 1, she will have utility:
λ
−γ (qj (t))
γ (1 − γ)
1−γ γ
γyi (t).
The limit price equalizes these two expressions, hence, equilibrium prices for all j and t satisfy:
pj (t)=λ. (4)
The proﬁts of the ﬁrm with the best product of quality qj (t) in line j at time t are:




=( λ − 1)γYj (t)
where the second line deﬁnes Yj (t) ≡
P
i∈Gj yi (t) as the total income of the group of consumers
demanding drug j.H e r e λγYj (t) corresponds to the market size (total sales) for drug j.
Throughout we assume that all Yj (t)’s are known in advance, which is plausible in the context
of demographics-driven changes in demand. They can change because the number of consumers
demanding this product changes, or because their incomes change, or also because new varieties
of drugs steal consumers from this particular drug. Notice that proﬁts of drug companies are
independent from quality, qj (t), which is a feature of the Cobb-Douglas utility function.
Firms are forward-looking, and discount future proﬁts at the rate r. The discounted value
of proﬁts for ﬁrms can be written by a standard dynamic programming recursion. Vj (t | qj),
the value of a ﬁrm that owns the most advanced drug of quality qj in line j at time t,i s : 9
rVj (t | qj) − ˙ Vj (t | qj)= πj (qj) − δjzj (t | qj)Vj (t | qj) (6)
9Throughout, we assume that the relevant transversality conditions hold and discounted values are ﬁnite.
6for each j =1 ,2,...,J,w h e r eπj (qj) is the ﬂow proﬁts in drug line j given by (5), and zj (t | qj)
is equilibrium R&D eﬀo r ta tt i m et on this line by other ﬁrms when current technology is qj
(because of the standard replacement eﬀect ﬁrst emphasized by Arrow, 1963, the ﬁrm with
the best technology does not undertake any R&D itself, see, for example, Aghion and Howitt,
1992). To simplify notation, we will typically use zj (t) instead of zj (t | qj).I n t u i t i v e l y , t h e
ﬂow value of owning the best technology in line j, rVj (t | qj), is equal to the ﬂow proﬁts, πj (qj)
plus the potential appreciation of the value, ˙ Vj (t | qj), but also takes into account that at the
ﬂow rate nj (t)=δjzj (t) there will be a new innovation, thus the current ﬁrm will lose its
best-practice status, and make zero proﬁts thereafter.
Note that entry of new drugs that are not technologically superior, but steal customers
from the incumbent, such as the entry of generics, can also be included in zj (t), especially
since equation (5) shows that the proﬁts of a new entrant are independent of the quality of its
product, as long as it is suﬃcient to take over (part of) the market. Thus for now, we think
of zj (t) and nj (t) as corresponding to the entry of both generic and non-generic drugs, and in
subsection 2.4, we present a model with separate entry rates of generics and non-generics.
There is free entry into R&D to develop better quality drugs. Therefore, if there is positive
research for some drug line j =1 ,2,...,J at time t, then the free entry condition ensuring zero
proﬁts must hold. In other words,
if zj (t) > 0,t h e nδjVj (t | qj)= 1 . (7)
Alternatively, we might have zj (t)=0 ,a n dδjVj (t | qj) ≤ 1, in which case research is not
proﬁtable, and in equilibrium, there will be no innovation.
An equilibrium in this economy is sequences of prices pj (t)|j=1,..J that satisfy (4), consumer
demands for drugs xi (t)|i∈I that satisfy (2) and sequences of R&D levels zj (t)|j=1,..J that satisfy
(7) with Vj (·) given by (6).
An equilibrium is straightforward to characterize. Diﬀerentiating equation (7) with respect
to time implies that we must always have ˙ Vj (t | qj)=0for each j =1 ,2,...,J as long as
zj (t) > 0. Substituting this equation and (7) into (6) yields the levels of R&D eﬀort in the
unique equilibrium:
zj (t)=m a x
½





for each j =1 ,2,...,J,a n df o ra l lt. From now on, unless otherwise stated, we assume that
Yj (t)’s are such that all equilibrium research levels are strictly positive, i.e., zj (t) > 0 for all j
and t,s ot h a tzj (t)=( δj (λ − 1)γYj (t) − r)/δj, and we will often drop the max operator.
7The most important feature of (8) is that it highlights the market size eﬀect in innovation,
which is the main focus of this paper. The greater is the market size for a particular drug, the
more proﬁtable it is to be the supplier of that drug, and consequently, there will be greater
research eﬀort to acquire this position. Our empirical work below investigates the strength of
this eﬀect in the pharmaceutical industry over recent decades. In addition, naturally, a higher
productivity of R&D as captured by δj also increases R&D, and a higher interest rate reduces
R&D since current R&D expenditures are rewarded by future revenues.
Another important implication of this equation is that there are no transitional dynamics.
At any point in time, the amount of eﬀort devoted to developing a particular drug line is
determined by the current market size. Past market sizes and anticipated future market sizes
do not aﬀect current research eﬀort. This is an implication of the linear R&D technology,
which ensures that whenever there are proﬁt opportunities, there will immediately be suﬃcient
R&D to arbitrage them, thus ensuring ˙ Vj (t | qj)=0 . The intuition for the lack of response to
anticipated changes in future market size here highlights an important eﬀect in quality ladder
models of technological progress: with a greater market size in the future, ﬁrms would like to
own the best-practice product at the time when the market size has actually become larger.
I n v e s t i n gi nR & Di na d v a n c ec o u l db eu s e f u lt ot h ee x t e n tt h a ti ta c h i e v e st h i so b j e c t i v e .
However, it is not beneﬁcial to invest in R&D too much in advance, since some other ﬁrm
would improve over this innovation by the time the new and larger market size materializes.
With the linear model here, zj can change discontinuously, so investing even a little bit in
advance of the actual increase in the size of the market is not proﬁtable.10
Combining equations (3) and (8) gives entry of new drugs as (ignoring the max operator):
nj (t)=δj (λ − 1)γYj (t) − r. (9)
This equation relates innovation or entry of new products, which we will approximate with
FDA approval of new drugs, to market size (total expenditure of consumers in this line of
drug). In addition, this equation also encapsulates the alternative view of the determinants
of innovation, which maintains that cross-drug distribution of R&D is determined largely by
technological research opportunities or perhaps by other non-proﬁt related motives. If there
are large and potentially time-varying diﬀerences in δj’s, then these may be the primary factor
determining variations in R&D across drug lines, and market size may have only a small eﬀect.
Whether or not this is so is an empirical question.
10In practice, companies may also have an incentive not to market their discoveries before the market size
increases in order to prevent competitors from leapfrogging their new product.
82.2 Delays in Development and Approval
The baseline model ignores the potential delays in the process of development and approval
of new drugs (for example, DiMasi et al., 1991, report that the eventual marketing of a drug
may be as much as 15 years after the beginning of initial research). To incorporate such delays
in the simplest possible way, suppose that it takes an interval of length T after the research
decision for the drug to be developed, gain approval, and enter the market. Therefore, we now
have nj (t)=δjzj (t − T),w h e r ezj (t − T) i st h er a t eo fi n n o v a t i o na tt i m et − T.
Given this structure, the key value function changes to:
rVj (t | qj) − ˙ Vj (t | qj)= πj (qj) − δjzj (t − T)Vj (t | qj). (10)
Equation (10) is a delayed diﬀerential equation rather than an ordinary diﬀerential equation,
so a general analysis is more diﬃcult. Nevertheless, the unique equilibrium in this case is still
easy to characterize because of the simple structure here. Now the free entry condition is:
if zj (t − T) > 0,t h e nexp(−rT)δjVj (t | qj)= 1 , (11)
which recognizes that innovation eﬀort at time t−T will lead to revenues at time t, hence the
discounting for the interval of length T. Equations (10) and (11) together imply that:
zj (t − T)=m a x
½





which is very similar to (8), except for the term exp(−rT). This term takes into account
that because of the development and approval delays, costs of R&D are incurred before the
beneﬁts accrue. This equation also makes it clear that longer development and approval delays
discourage innovation.
Equation (12) may give the impression that there should now be a response of innovation
to future market sizes. This is not the case, however, since what we measure in the data is
not the actual R&D expenditure, but entry of new drugs. Since nj (t)=δjzj (t − T),t h ek e y
prediction of the model for entry of new drugs changes to:
nj (t)=e x p( −rT)δj (λ − 1)γYj (t) − r,
which only diﬀers from (9) by the term exp(−rT).T h i sa n a l y s i st h e r e f o r es h o w st h a td e l a y s
in development and approval processes do not change the basic predictions relating to entry of
new drugs, though the predictions about the timing of R&D and patenting are diﬀerent (and
this is useful to bear in mind when we look at patents below).
92.3 Anticipation Effects
We now generalize this basic setup to obtain a reaction to (anticipated) future market sizes.
We change the baseline model in one dimension: we assume that one unit of ﬁnal good spent
for R&D in line j leads to the discovery of a better drug at the ﬂow rate δjzjφ(zj),w h e r ezj
is the aggregate research eﬀort devoted to the discovery of a new drug in this line. We also
assume that φ
0 (z) ≤ 0 for all z, which implies that greater research eﬀo r tr u n si n t od e c r e a s i n g
returns within a given period (there are constant returns to scale when φ(z)=1for all z), but
throughout zφ(z) is strictly increasing in z, so that greater aggregate research eﬀort always
leads to faster innovation in the aggregate.
Finally, free entry into R&D for all lines implies that any new ﬁrm can enter taking zj (t)
as given, thus without taking into account the reduction that its entry causes in the innovation
rates of other ﬁrms.11 Given this speciﬁcation, the value function changes to:
rVj (t | qj) − ˙ Vj (t | qj)= πj (qj) − δjzj (t)φ(zj (t))Vj (t | qj), (13)
for each j =1 ,2,...,J, which only diﬀers from (6) because the ﬂow rate of innovation is now
δjzj (t)φ(zj (t)) rather than δjzj (t).
Since each potential entrant takes the aggregate research eﬀo r ti ne a c hl i n eo fd r u ga sg i v e n ,
it anticipates that one unit of the basic good spent for R&D in drug line j will lead to an
innovation at the ﬂow rate δjφ(zj (t)).T h u s ,t h ef r e ee n t r yc o n d i t i o ni s
δjφ(zj (t))Vj (t | qj)= 1 , (14)
for each j =1 ,2,...,J (again as long as zj (t) > 0).
An equilibrium is deﬁned similarly to before, except that now the sequence of R&D levels
zj (t)|j=1,..J have to satisfy (14) instead of (7) with Vj (·) given by (13).
To make further progress in this case, let us assume that Yj (t)=Yj for all t,s ot h a tm a r k e t
sizes remain constant over time. Diﬀerentiating (14) with respect to time, and substituting into






[r + δjzj (t)φ(zj (t)) − δjφ(zj (t))(λ − 1)γYj], (15)
where εφ (zj (t)) = −φ
0 (zj (t))zj (t)/φ(zj (t)) is the elasticity of the φ function.
11This is the natural assumption given free entry. The alternative would be to assume that there is a
consortium of ﬁrms in each line, jointly maximizing proﬁts. In this case, the free entry condition below would
change to: δj
£
φ(zj (qj (t))) + zj (qj (t))φ
0 (zj (qj (t)))
¤
Vj(qj (t)) = 1.T h i sd o e sn o ta ﬀect any of the results of
the analysis.
10Since consumer incomes are now assumed to be constant, the steady-state equilibrium must















In the special case where φ(.)=1 , this equation boils down to (8) in the basic model. Moreover,
the steady-state R&D levels have the same features as the equilibrium there: a greater market
size increases R&D, a greater δj, which corresponds to better research opportunities for this
drug line, increases R&D, and higher interest rates reduce R&D.
An important feature of this equation is that the equilibrium behavior of zj (t) is inde-
pendent of research and proﬁtability in other drug lines. This feature simpliﬁes the dynamics
substantially. In addition, the right hand side of (15) is strictly increasing in zj (t) whenever
zj (t)=zS
j , which implies that there can be at most one intersection of the right hand side
with the 0 axis, and at this point of intersection, ˙ zj (t)/zj (t) is increasing in zj (t),a sd r a w ni n
Figure 1. Therefore, (15) deﬁnes an unstable diﬀerential equation. This implies that starting
away from the steady-state, the equilibrium zj (t) has to immediately jump to its steady-state
value as given by (16). Hence, there are no transitional dynamics in this extended model either.
However, there is now an equilibrium response to anticipated future changes in market size.
Consider the following situation: it is suddenly announced at date t0 that Yj will increase to
ˆ Yj in some future date ˆ t>t 0. How will this fully-anticipated change in market size aﬀect
equilibrium R&D? Suppose there is no change in zj (t) until ˆ t.T h i si m p l i e st h a tzj (t) has to
jump up discontinuously at t = ˆ t. But this implies that anticipating this jump, Vj (t | qj) will
be changing before ˆ t,i np a r t i c u l a r , ˙ Vj (t | qj) < 0.S i n c e zj (t) is constant, this would violate
the free entry condition, (14). This reasoning implies that there should be no anticipated
jumps in zj (t),i np a r t i c u l a rn oj u m pa tt = ˆ t, which is only possible if zj (t) jumps by a
small amount initially at t = t0, and then smoothly increases towards the new steady-state
equilibrium. Therefore, in this model there are no transitional dynamics starting away from
the steady-state, but R&D responds to anticipated future market size changes. Nevertheless,
the same considerations as in the baseline model limit this response. In other words, even if
a change in market size is anticipated far in advance, increasing R&D investment too far in
a d v a n c ew o u l dn o tb ep r o ﬁtable because another ﬁrm is likely to innovate further before the
actual increase in market size materializes. In terms of our empirical work, even if demographic
changes are anticipated at least 20 or 30 years in advance, we may expect signiﬁcant innovation
responses much later, perhaps 5 or 10 years in advance or even contemporaneously.12
12A previous version of the paper also investigated a number of other generalizations, which we omit because
112.4 Generics and Non-Generics
The analysis so far did not distinguish between generics and non-generics. In the empirical
work, we ﬁrst look at all entries, and then distinguish between generics and non-generic drugs–
which better correspond to “innovation”. We now brieﬂy discuss how the predictions of the
model change when we incorporate a distinction between generics and non-generics. We do
this in the simplest possible way, and assume that pharmaceutical ﬁrms can engage in R&D to
discover new drugs as described above, or they can engage in costly development to introduce a
generic version of an already-existing drug (without quality improvement).13 Although bringing
a generic drug to the market does not involve original research, it still requires substantial
resources spent upfront (for the approval process or for marketing).14
L e tu ss u p p o s et h a to n eu n i to ft h eﬁnal good devoted to prepare a generic for the market
in drug line j leads to successful entry at time t at the ﬂow rate θj, so entry of new generics
at time t is given by gj (t)=θjhj (t),w h e r ehj (t) is total generic development expenditure
for drug line j at time t. In practice, in addition to technological factors, length of patents on
non-generics inﬂuences θj. We assume that θj >δ j, since introducing a generic to the market
must be easier than inventing a new drug.
If there is entry of a generic into drug line j at time t, we assume that both the incumbent
and the generic entrant receive proﬁts of µ(λ − 1)γYj (t) where Yj (t) is deﬁn e di n( 5 ) ,a n dµ ∈
[0,1/2). Recall that if the generic entrant and the incumbent engage in Bertrand competition,
then they will both charge marginal cost, and we would have µ =0 . The formulation here allows
some degree of non-Bertrand (e.g., Cournot) competition or collusion, so µ>0 is possible. If
of space constraints.
Brieﬂy, we allowed research to be only imperfectly directed, so that research towards the drug line j leads to
a ﬂow rate of pδj of discovering a new drug of this type, and to a ﬂow rate of (1 − p)δj0/J any j0 =1 ,...,J,
where 1 ≥ p>0.W h e n p =1 , we have the model of subsection 2.1, while with p → 0, research becomes
undirected. Interestingly, this generalization does not aﬀect the results of the model, and even with p → 0,t h e
innovation rates are given exactly by (9), and thus the results do not depend on the assumption of perfectly
directed research.
We also generalized to set up by allowing “technological drift”, meaning random innovations arising from non-
proﬁt and non-economic motives, which again did not aﬀect the results, and led to an equilibrium relationship
similar to (9). Details are available upon request.
13An alternative approach would be to link the entry of non-generics directly to the delayed entry of generics,
since generics can only enter after the patents on previous non-generics expire. Nevertheless, because introducing
a generic into the market still involves signiﬁcant upfront costs, we expect proﬁt incentives to play a major role
here. A hybrid model incorporating both such delays and proﬁti n c e n t i v e si ss i g n i ﬁcantly more complicated to
analyze.
14Prior to 1984, the FDA demanded a similar application process for approval of a generic drug as for a
non-generic. For example, the generic drug’s safety and eﬃcacy had to be demonstrated through clinical trials.
DiMasi et al (1991) suggest that the cost of approval for a generic was as much as 40% of the cost of a non-
generic. The Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 allowed a company to obtain FDA approval for a generic drug by
demonstrating that it is molecularly similar to and has the same active ingredients, indications and strength as
the non-generic, substantially reducing the costs of introducing a generic. Reiﬀen and Ward (2002) estimate the
cost of introducing a new generic to be around $5 million after the Act, compared to over one hundred million
dollars before (DiMasi et al, 1991).
12µ =0 , there would be no entry of generics, and the results in subsection 2.1 would apply.
In addition, we assume that in a market that already includes the incumbent and a generic
producer, there is no further room for a third producer, so we can ignore the potential entry
from further generic producers. Allowing for further entry of this sort introduces additional
notation, but does not aﬀect our qualitative results.
Given this structure, the value of innovation (for a non-generic) is now given by
rVj (t | qj) − ˙ Vj (t | qj)= πj (qj)−δjzj (qj)Vj (t | qj)−θjhj (t)[Vj (t | qj) − Wj (t | qj)], (17)
where πj (qj)=µ(λ − 1)γYj (t) as before and Wj (t | qj) is the value of being one of two
producers supplying drug j at time t. The main diﬀerence between this expression and (6)
above is the last term, which takes into account that at the ﬂow rate θjhj (t) there will be
entry of a generic, in which case the innovator loses its monopoly position, and the associated
value Vj (t | qj), and becomes one of two producers, receiving value Wj (t | qj). With a similar
reasoning to before, this value is given by:
rWj (t | qj) − ˙ Wj (t | qj)= µπj (qj) − δjzj (t)Wj (t | qj). (18)
Intuitively, the only reason why the ﬂow of proﬁts captured by Wj (t | qj) will come to an end
is because there is a better drug introduced to the market, which happens at the rate δjzj (t).
Free entry requires that
zj (t) ≥ 0,a n dδjVj (t | qj) ≤ 1 with complementary slackness
hj (t) ≥ 0,a n dθjWj (t | qj) ≤ 1 with complementary slackness.
These conditions are similar to (7) above, but written out explicitly in the form of a comple-
mentary slackness condition to emphasize that there may not be R&D for new drugs or any
generic entry under certain conditions. Let us next assume that
µθj <δ j (19)
for all j. If this assumption does not hold, entry of new generics is so rapid that it ceases
to become proﬁtable for pharmaceutical companies to introduce new drugs, and consequently,
quality improvements come to an end. As long as Assumption (19) holds, similar arguments
to before imply that the unique equilibrium is given by:
zj (t)=




(δj − µθj)(λ − 1)γYj (t)
θj − δj
.
13It can also be veriﬁed that if µ =0 , the equilibrium of Proposition 1 applies, and if Assumption
(19) does not hold, there will be no R&D, i.e., zj (t)=0 ,a n dt h u slimt→∞ hj (t)=0(or
Prlimt→∞ hj (t)=0 ) as there will eventually be two producers in the market for drug j.
Moreover, the entry rate of non-generics and generics, nj (t) and gj (t),a r e :
nj (t)=µθj (λ − 1)γYj (t) − r, (21)
gj (t)=
θj (δj − µθj)(λ − 1)γYj (t)
θj − δj
.
There are a number of important points to note about this equilibrium. First, the entry
rates of both non-generics and generics respond positively to market size. Therefore, this
model generalizes the key prediction of our baseline model in subsection 2.1. Second, other
comparative static results are now quite diﬀerent than in the baseline model. The entry rates
of non-generics no longer respond to δj (and zj (t) is decreasing in δj). Instead, they respond
positively to µ and θj (two parameters that should intuitively make entry of generics more
proﬁtable). This is because the rate of entry of non-generics is determined to ensure 0 proﬁts
for generics; once generic drugs enter the market, their producers will continue to make proﬁts
until there is a new and better drug. Finally, diﬀerentiating the equations in (21) with respect
to Yj (t) shows that either generics or non-generics may respond more to changes in market size
(it depends on whether µ or (δj − µθj)/(θj − δj) is larger). Plausibly, we expect µ to be small
and θj −δj to be large, and therefore, generic entry to be more responsive to changes in market
size than non-generic entry.15
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Empirical Specification and Estimation Issues
As r → 0, we can take logs on both sides of equation (9) to obtain:
lognj (t)=constant +l o gδj +l o gmj (t), (22)
where mj (t) ≡ λγYj (t) is the market size for drug line j at time t. We measure entry of new
drugs (or innovation), nj (t), as new drug approvals by the FDA (Food and Drug Administra-
tion) in broad drug categories as described below.16 This measure, denoted by Nct for drug
category c at time t, includes entry of generic drugs. Although generic drugs do not correspond
to “innovation” according to the standard use of this term, they are still driven by the same
15In practice, the presence of uncertain delays in the development and approval process for non-generics may
also imply a smaller response to the current market size for these drugs.
16Besides new drug approvals and patents, which we also use below, there is a third proxy for innovation
rates: clinical trials. We were unable to obtain data on clinical trials for a suﬃcient number of drug categories.
14proﬁt incentives as innovation, and are similar to innovation in the context of our model.17
After presenting results using all drug approvals, we separate generics from non-generics, and
investigate whether the relationship between market size and entry diﬀers for the two types
of drugs. Instead of actual market size, mj (t), we will use potential market size driven by
demographic changes, which we denote by Mct, and discuss its construction below.
Adding other potential determinants, time eﬀects and an error term capturing other unob-
served inﬂuences, and allowing the coeﬃcient of logMct to diﬀe rf r o m1a si tw o u l dw i t hm o r e
general preferences than Cobb-Douglas, we arrive at an estimating equation of the form:
logNct = α · logMct + X
0
ct · β + ζc + µt + εct, (23)
where Nct is the number of new drugs in category c in time period t, Mct is potential market
size, X0
ct is a vector of controls, including a constant, with β as the corresponding vector of
coeﬃcients, ζc’s are a full set of category ﬁxed eﬀects that correspond to the logδj terms
above, µt’s are a full set of time eﬀects capturing any common time component, and ﬁnally,
εct is a random disturbance term, capturing all omitted inﬂuences. The speciﬁcation with the
dependent variable in logarithm is useful, since it ensures that drug category ﬁxed eﬀects and
time eﬀects have proportional impacts on entry of new drugs.
One problem with equation (23) is that Nct is a count variable (number of new drugs), so
it can equal 0. In our data, this is not common, but in most speciﬁcations there are typically
a few drug category-time cells where Nct is equal to 0. This makes it impossible to estimate
(23). We take a number of approaches to this problem. First, we change (23) to
log ˜ Nct = α · logMct + X
0
ct · β + γ · dct + ζc + µt + εct, (24)
where ˜ Nct = Nct if Nct ≥ 1 and ˜ Nct =1if Nct =0 , and the variable dct is a dummy that
equals 1 when there are no approvals, i.e., dct =1if Nct =0and dct =0otherwise. This
procedure, which was ﬁrst used by Pakes and Griliches (1980), has the advantage of simplicity
and ﬂexibility (the data determine how Nct =0should be treated). The drawkback is that the
variable dct is mechanically a function of Nct, so it can introduce various biases.
More satisfactory is to consider the following Poisson model (see, for example, Wooldridge,
1999, 2002, or Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984):
Nct =e x p ( α · logMct + X
0
ct · β + ζc + µt)+εct, (25)
17Moreover, if generics and non-generics are imperfect substitutes, generics would correspond to new products,
and their entry would increase consumer welfare in a manner similar to technological improvements, and in fact,
formally correspond to technological change in the product variety models (e.g., Romer, 1990, Grossman and
Helpman, 1991).
15which is a slight variant on equation (23) above. Estimates from the two models are typically
similar when there are only a few empty approval cells. When there are more empty cells, as
when we look separately at generics and non-generics, there are larger discrepancies between
the two models, and in those cases we favor the Poisson model.
The estimation of (25) would lead to biased estimates, however, since the ﬁxed eﬀects, the
ζc’s, cannot be estimated consistently. To deal with this problem, we follow Hausman, Hall,
and Griliches (1984), and transform (25) to obtain:
Sct =
exp(α · logMct + X0
ct · β + µt)
PT
τ=1 exp(α · logMcτ + X0
cτ · β + µτ)
+ εct, (26)
where Sct = Nct/
PT
τ=1 Ncτ is the number of drugs approved in category c at time t, divided by
the total number of drugs approved in category c,a n dT is the total number of time periods
in the sample. This transformation removes the drug category dummies, and the coeﬃcient
of interest, α, can be estimated consistently. We estimate this equation using nonlinear least
squares (NLLS) as well as maximum likelihood (ML). Woodridge (1999) shows that NLLS
estimation strategy has good consistency properties, even when the true model is not Poisson.
Finally, we also report some estimates from the negative binomial model which relaxes the
distributional assumptions of the Poisson model in a maximum likelihood context (see, for
example, Wooldridge, 2002, or Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984).
In addition to equations (24) and (26), which have the contemporaneous value of logMct
on the right hand side, we also estimate equations with leads and lags of logMct to determine
whether there are signiﬁcant delays and anticipation eﬀects. Such eﬀects are possible, since, as
reported by DiMasi et al. (1991), it can take as long as 15 years for a drug to enter the market
from the time of initial research. Furthermore, changes in demographics can be anticipated
a long time in advance, so drug approvals may respond to anticipated future market sizes, as
highlighted by our analysis in subsection 2.3.
3.2 Potential Market Size and Identification
Throughout, we exploit the potentially exogenous component of market size driven by demo-
graphic trends, combined with diﬀerences in the age distribution of users for diﬀerent types of
drugs. We obtain the age composition of users (and expenditure) from micro drug consumption
data, and the changes in U.S. demographics from the CPS (Current Population Survey) data.




uca · pat, (27)
16where pat is the U.S. population or income of age group a at time t,a n duca is the time-invariant
measure of consumption of drug category c by individuals in age group a.W et a k et i m ep e r i o d s
to be either ﬁv e - y e a ro rt e n - y e a ri n t e r v a l s .
We compute Mct in two alternative ways: ﬁrst, we use the U.S. population for age group a
at time t for pat and the average number of drugs in category c used per person in age group
a for uca; and second, we use the total income of age group a for pat and the average share of
drugs in category c in the total expenditure of those in age group a for uca. The latter, which
we refer to be as the income-based measure, corresponds more closely to market size in the
theoretical model, which is a combination of the number of consumers and their incomes, and
will be our main measure.18 For both measures, the over-time source of variation is not from
changes in individual use, but purely from demographic changes captured by pat–i.e., uca’s are
not time-varying. So for example, changes in prices, which potentially result from innovations
and aﬀect consumption patterns, will not cause over-time variation in Mct.
The major threat to the validity of our empirical strategy is from potentially time-varying
omitted variables (any variable that is not time-varying is taken out by the drug category ﬁxed
eﬀects). Omitted variables related to market size or proﬁt opportunities may induce a bias in
the implied magnitudes, but will not lead to spurious positive estimates of the eﬀect of market
size (in other words, the presence of such variables is essentially equivalent to mismeasurement
of the appropriate market size). More threatening to our identiﬁcation strategy would be
omitted supply-side variables. If our instrument is valid, it should be orthogonal to variation
in supply-side determinants of entry. We attempt to substantiate our identifying assumption
further by including lagged dependent variables, and adding controls such as pre-existing trends
and proxies for other incentives to undertake research in a particular ﬁeld.19
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
4.1 Basic Data Sources
The demographic data come from the March CPS, 1964-2000. We construct ﬁve age groups,
0-20, 20-30, 30-50, 50-60, and 60+. These divisions are motivated by drug use patterns of
these age groups. To construct income shares, we divide household income equally among the
18If preferences have a Cobb-Douglas form as in (1) and are stable, the expenditure measure of uca will always
be constant. With non-Cobb-Douglas preferences, changes in prices will induce changes in uca over time. In
this case, by using a time-invariant measure of uca, we remove this potentially endogenous source of variation.
19Another source of endogeneity may be that innovations in certain drug categories extend the lives of the
elderly, thus increasing their Mct. Lichtenberg (2003) provides evidence that new drugs extend lives. This
source of endogeneity is not likely to be quantitatively important, however, since the variation resulting from
extended lives in response to new drugs is a small fraction of the total variation in Mct. Nevertheless, we will
also report estimates that instrument Mct with past demographics, purging it from changes in longevity.
17members of the household. Figure 2 shows population shares for the ﬁve age groups, and Figure
3 shows the corresponding income shares (i.e., income of the corresponding age group divided
by total income). To facilitate comparison with Figure 4, this ﬁgure starts in 1970. Both ﬁgures
show a large amount of variation across age groups over time. In particular, it is possible to
trace the baby boomers, as the fraction of those in the age bracket 20-30 in the 1970s, and
those in the age bracket 30-50 in the 1980s and the 1990s.
The FDA classiﬁes all prescription drugs into 20 major drug categories, which are further
subdivided into 159 categories. These categories are based on a combination of therapeutic
intent and chemical structure.20 We drop 4 of the 20 major categories from this classiﬁcation:
Anesthetics, Antidotes, Radiopharmaceuticals and Miscellaneous.21 We obtain a total of 34
categories by breaking 10 of the 16 remaining categories into ﬁner groups when there are signif-
icant heterogeneity in terms of the age distribution of users across subcategories. We separate
the major categories of Antimicrobials, Psychopharmacologics, Nutrients, Hormones, Dermato-
logics, Neorologics, Ophthalmics, Otologics, Pain Relief and Respiratory because within these
categories there are subcategories with signiﬁcantly diﬀerent age proﬁles of users. For example,
within Antimicrobials, 0-20 year-olds use Antibiotics (except Tetracyclines) the most, while
Antivirals are used most by people 30 and older. Appendix Table A1 lists the 34 categories.
Our main data source for drug use is the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), which
is a sample of U.S. households over the years 1996-1998. The survey has age and income data for
each household member, and covers about 25,000 individuals in each year. There is also a list of
prescription drugs used by each person (if any), and the amount spent on drugs. In all, there are
about 500,000 medications prescribed. We construct drug use per person and expenditure share
for each category and each of our ﬁve age groups. Appendix Table A1 reports these numbers,
and shows a large amount of variation across drug categories. Many of the categories are
used more by older people than by younger, but there are numerous exceptions. For example,
Contraceptives are used most by 20-30 and 30-50 year-olds, and Penicillins and Antibacterials
are used most by individuals in the youngest group. We construct the measures of potential
market size according to equation (27) by combining data from the MEPS and the CPS.
We supplement the MEPS data with the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS),
20Other authors, for example Lichtenberg (2003), use a diﬀerent classiﬁcation system based on diseases. For
our purposes, the FDA classiﬁcation is attractive, both because it enables us to construct a better classiﬁcation
of all approved drugs currently on the market, and because the microdata surveys give the FDA classes for the
drugs that the respondents use (see Data Appendix for details).
21We drop the Anesthetics, Radiopharmaceuticals and Miscellaneous categories because most of the items
in these categories were not developed for a distinct market. Radiopharmaceuticals are used for diagnostic
purposes, and the Miscellaneous category mainly contains surgical and dental tools. The Antidote category is
dropped because there are few drugs approved and there is little use of these drugs in the surveys. See the Data
Appendix for further details on the contruction of our categories.
18which is an annual survey of doctors working in private practices. The survey includes drug
use for the years 1980, 1981, 1985, and 1989-2000. Observations are at the doctor-patient-visit
level; there are about 40,000 visits per year. Doctors are selected randomly, surveyed for a
week, with patient-visits selected randomly from the week. The main use of the NAMCS is
that it covers a longer time period, enabling us to check whether the age composition of users
across categories has changed over time. Using the NAMCS data, we construct a second drug
categorization, with 30 categories.22
Table 1 gives correlations between various measures of drug use. Panel A shows a high degree
of correlation between the NAMCS surveys at various dates, indicating that the age proﬁle of
users has not changed signiﬁcantly over the 1980s and the 1990s. The overall correlation row
looks at the unconditional correlation. We also report weighted correlations, where observations
are weighted by cell size in the MEPS or NAMCS. Weighted correlations are larger than the
overall correlation because our estimates of the age distribution of users are less precise when
there are fewer individuals using drugs in a particular category. The third row reports mean
correlation by drug, which calculates the within category correlation between the two measures
and then averages it across all categories. This m e a s u r ei sm o r ei n f o r m a t i v ef o rt h eq u e s t i o no f
whether the age distribution of users for a particular drug has changed over time.
P a n e lBp e r f o r m st h es a m ec a l c u l a t i o nf o rt h et h r e ew a v e so ft h eM E P S ,a n ds i m i l a r l ys h o w s
substantial persistence in the age distribution of drug expenditure. Finally, panel C shows a
high degree of correlation between expenditure shares and use per person in the MEPS data.
But perhaps surprisingly, there is low correlation between the NAMCS and the MEPS. This
is because the two surveys yield very diﬀerent estimates for total use of each category (but
very similar estimates of relative use by age groups within each category, as shown by the high
level of mean correlation by drug). We conjecture that this reﬂects the fact that NAMCS,
which samples doctors in private practice rather than individuals, is not as representative as
the MEPS.
The last major data source is a list of new FDA drug approvals. We exclude over-the-counter
drugs, the so-called orphan drugs,23 and drugs that have the same identifying characteristics
22Appendix Table A2, which is available upon request, compares this classiﬁcation system with the 34 category
system developed with the MEPS. Some of the 159 categories have been dropped from one classiﬁcation system,
but not from the other, because there were not suﬃcient observations to construct reliable estimates of drug
use from one of the surveys. Appendix Table A2 shows that the two systems are closely related. In general
the 34 category system is a slightly less aggregated version of the 30 category system. Nevertheless, there are
a number of cases where a given FDA category is combined with a second FDA category in one system, but
with a third FDA category in the other system (e.g., Misc. Antibacterials are with Sulfonamides in the MEPS
system, but with Antiseptics in the NAMCS system).
23These drugs treat rare conditions, aﬀecting fewer than 200,000 people. An example is botox, ﬁrst developed
to treat adult dystonia, which causes involuntary muscle contractions. We drop these drugs because we have
diﬃculty matching them consistently, and because they receive special inducements under the Orphan Drug
19(i.e., same name, company, and category, or the same FDA approval number). We focus on
the time period 1970-2000. Since we can only match FDA categories for drugs that are still
listed by the FDA, the quality of the approvals data deteriorates as we go back in time. In
addition, because we are using age composition from the 1990s, the quality of our measures of
potential market size also deteriorates as we go back in time. Our approvals dataset for 1970-
2000 comprises 6,595 prescription drugs, including both generics and non-generics (see the
Appendix). Since 1970 there have been about half as many approved non-generics as generics.
Figure 4 shows the share of drug approvals over time to compare with changes in income
shares depicted in Figure 3 (or population shares shown in Figure 2). To construct Figure 4,
we compute drug approvals over ﬁve-year intervals for the 34 categories. We then combine the
34 categories into ﬁve groups, based on the age group that accounts for the largest fraction of
use in that category (thus this cut of the data uses only part of information that we will exploit
in the regression analysis), and compute the share of drug approvals by dividing the number of
approvals in a given category by total approvals in that time period.24 Comparing this ﬁgure
with Figure 3, a positive association between contemporaneous changes in population share
and changes in drug approvals for the corresponding age group can be detected visually. For
example, the income share of the 30-50 group increases over the sample, and so does the entry
of drugs most used by this group. Both the shares of income and entry of drugs for those 0-20,
on the other hand, show a downward trend, while those for the 60+ age group show an increase
followed by a decline. Table 2 also shows changes in income shares by age group and in FDA
drug approvals (for all drugs as well as separately for generics and non-generics), and conﬁrms
the patterns depicted in Figures 3 and 4. These patterns are explored in greater detail in the
regression analysis below.
5R e s u l t s
5.1 Basic Specifications
Table 3A provides the basic results from the estimation of (24) and (26) with non-linear least-
squares (NLLS) and ordinary least-squares (OLS), and Table 3B reports maximum likelihood
estimates of the Poisson and negative binomial models. We start with the potential market size
measure constructed using MEPS data. These basic speciﬁcations do not contain any covariates
Act.
24There are large ﬂuctuations in the total number of approvals, presumably because of a number of institu-
tional changes. For example, it was discovered in 1989 that some FDA oﬃcials were taking bribes to speed up
the approval process for generic drugs. As a result, in the early 1990s the approval process for generics was
greatly slowed. See, for example, The Washington Post, August 16, 1989. When we separate our approval data
into generics and non-generics, we see a large drop in generics approvals in the early 1990s, but only a small
decline for non-generics. We thank Ernie Berndt for suggestions on this issue.
20other than drug category eﬀects and time eﬀects. The results show a large and signiﬁcant eﬀect
of (potential) market size (logMct) on entry of new drugs.
In column 1 of Table 3A, we start with our basic “income-weighted” measure of logMct,
constructed using expenditure data from the MEPS data set, and income from the CPS, with
the time periods corresponding to ﬁve-year intervals. Since our estimates of age composition in
smaller categories are less precise, observations are weighted by MEPS cell sizes (total expendi-
ture for income-based measures in the cell and total drug use for population-based measures).
The standard errors throughout are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White
formula. The NLLS estimate of α in this basic speciﬁcation is 6.04 with a standard error of
1.95, which is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The OLS estimate is somewhat smaller, 4.52,
with standard error 2.00, thus signiﬁcant only at the 5 percent level.25
Potential market size appears to explain a sizable fraction of the total variation in the entry
of new drugs (for example, the partial R2 of the OLS speciﬁcation is 0.20), and the empirical
relationship is not driven by outliers. Figure 5 shows a plot of the residuals of logNct against
the residuals of logMct in the OLS regression, in both cases after drug category and period
dummies are taken out. Observations are labeled by their drug category codes (see Appendix
T a b l eA 1 ) ,a n de a c hc o d ea p p e a r sm o r et h a no n c e ,since there are multiple periods. The line in
the ﬁgure corresponds to the estimated relationship reported in column 1. Although categories
42, 43 and 61 (Anorexiants, Central Nervous System drugs and Vitamins/Minerals) typically
ﬁt the pattern less well and are outliers in either direction, excluding these has little eﬀect on
our estimate of α. For example, dropping these three categories leads to an NLLS estimate of
7.07 (s.e.= 2.29).
The quantitative magnitude of the eﬀect in column 1 is large but plausible, implying that
a 1 per cent increase in our market size measure leads to about a 6 percent increase in drug
approvals. Since there are a total of 6,595 approvals between 1970 and 2000, thus on average
32 approvals in every ﬁve-year interval in each of our 34 categories, the estimate of 6.04 implies
that a 1 percent increase in market size leads to the entry of about two new drugs. Total phar-
maceutical sales was approximately $130 billioni n1 9 9 9( I M S ,2 0 0 0 ) ,w h i c hi m p l i e sa na v e r a g e
annual expenditure of $3.8 billion per category. A 1 percent increase therefore corresponds to
$38 million, or about $570 million over 15 years, which is the life of a typical drug. Since entry
costs for non-generics are around $800 million (in 2000 dollars, DiMasi et al, 2001), while for
generics they have varied between $5 million and over $100 million (DiMasi et al, 1991, Reiﬀen
and Ward, 2002), entry of two new drugs in response to an increase of $570 million in revenue
25Clustering the standard errors at the level of drug categories has little eﬀect because there is no residual
serial correlation–see the lagged dependent variable speciﬁcations reported in Table 6.
21is within the range of plausible responses.
In column 2, we use ten-year intervals instead of the ﬁve-year intervals, both to reduce
the potential noise in the entry of new drugs during the ﬁve-year intervals and also to check
whether ten-year intervals correspond more closely to the relevant match between market size
and entry. The estimate of α using NLLS is now 4.95 with standard error 1.90, signiﬁcant at
the 1 percent level. The smaller NLLS estimate indicates that there might be some attenuation
with the ten-year invtervals, but the ten-year OLS estimate is slightly larger than the ﬁve-year
estimate. In the remainder, we mainly focus on ﬁve-year intervals.
Although the income-weighted measure of market size seems more satisfactory, in columns 3
and 4 we also look at the eﬀects of changes in market size driven purely by population changes.
Using this measure leads to estimates that are slightly larger for both NLLS and OLS, and are
estimated with about the same level of precision.26
To see the eﬀect of weighting on the estimates, columns 5 and 6 report unweighted regres-
sions. Without weights, the NLLS estimates are smaller than in columns 1 and 2, but still
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, and the OLS estimates, also smaller than in columns 1 and
2, are signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. We conjecture that this somewhat weaker relationship
without weights reﬂects the less precise estimation of age composition in the smaller categories,
which is illustrated by the correlations in Table 1.27
The results in Table 3B are broadly similar, and show that the main results are robust to
diﬀerent estimation methods. In panel A of that table, we use maximum likelihood to estimate
equation (26). The number below the estimate is the maximum-likelihood standard error, while
the number in curly brackets is the robust standard error that does not impose the Poisson
structure to calculate the standard errors, and instead uses the Huber-White formula. The
estimates are unweighted. In the ﬁr s tt w oc o l u m n s ,w ec o m p u t em a r k e ts i z eu s i n gi n c o m ea n d
expenditure. The estimates are larger than the corresponding estimates in columns 5 and 6
of Table 3A. In panel B we use a weighted maximum likelihood procedure, and obtain similar
estimates to those in columns 1-4 of Table 3A. Finally, we also report estimates from the
negative binomial model in panel C, which allows for overdispersion of the Poisson parameter.
In this case, the estimates of α are slightly smaller than those in columns 1-4 of Table 3A, and
26We also estimated these models using West European and Japanese demographic information in addition
to U.S. information (obtained from the United Nations website, esa.un.org/unpp/). Using the total population-
based market size measure combining European, Japanese and U.S. populations gives similar results to those
obtained using only U.S. information. For example, the NLLS speciﬁcation using this total market size and
ﬁve-year intervals gives an estimate of 5.27 (s.e.=1.50), as compared to the corresponding estimate of 6.16 in
column 3.
27This conjecture also receives support from the fact that when we construct our potential market size measure
using the NAMCS, which has a more even distribution of observations across drug categories, the unweighted
and weighted results are similar (see Table 7 below).
22still signiﬁcant at 1 or 5 percent.
5.2 Delays and Anticipation Effects
The theoretical analysis suggested that delays in the development and approval processes are
unlikely to create delays in the entry of new drugs in response to changes in market size, but
there is room for new drugs to enter before the actual increase in market size because of anticipa-
tion eﬀects, especially since demographics-driven changes in market size should be anticipated
in advance. We investigate the role of delays and anticipation eﬀects in this subsection by
including lags (logMc,t−1)a n dl e a d s( logMc,t+1) of potential market size on the right hand side
of our estimating equations.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 replicate the basic ﬁve-year and ten-year speciﬁcations from
Table 3A for comparison. Columns 3 and 4 include the market size from the previous period
and show that new drug entry responds mainly to current market size (in fact, the coeﬃcient
on lag market size is negative, though insigniﬁcant, presumably because current and previous
market sizes are highly correlated). For example, in column 3, the coeﬃcient on current market
size is larger than our baseline, 13.56 (s.e.=4.45) with NLLS, and 8.62 (s.e.= 3.91) with OLS.28
Columns 5 and 6 show that lag market size is also typically insigniﬁcant when entered by itself
(with the exception of Panel A in column 5, where it is signiﬁcant but much smaller than the
estimate with current market size in column 1). These results therefore show no evidence of
signiﬁcant delays in the response of new drug entries to changes in market size.
In column 7, we include the current and one period ahead market size. Both the contem-
poraneous and lead market sizes are individually insigniﬁcant, but jointly signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level. The coeﬃcient on lead market size is much larger. In column 8, when we use
ten-year intervals, instead, the coeﬃcients are about the same magnitude, but current market
size is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level (and similar to the baseline) while the lead market
size is insigniﬁcant. Columns 9 and 10 show large and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients when we include
only future market size.29 T h e s er e s u l t st h e r e f o r es u g g e s tt h a tt h e r em a yb es o m ea n t i c i p a t i o n
eﬀects, perhaps with ﬁve- or ten-year leads, which is consistent with the possibility of limited
anticipation eﬀects highlighted by the theoretical model.30
28We construct the lagged market size measures for 1960s using demographic information from the CPS, so
the number of observations does not decline. The results are similar if we only use the post-1970 data.
29We have also extended the sample for the lead speciﬁcation by combining the population projections of
the U.S. Census Bureau for 2010 with the incomes from the 1990s (the results are also similar if we use a
linear extrapolation to predict future income). Using this additional period yields similar results. For example,
re-estimating the speciﬁcation in column 4 with NLLS, the estimate on current market size is 3.10 (s.e.=3.75)
and the estimate on lead market size is 4.33 (s.e.=4.03), jointly signiﬁcant at 1 percent. The speciﬁcation in
column 6 gives an estimate on lead market size of 7.10 (s.e.=1.86).
30Here “limited” does not refer to the strength of the eﬀect, but to the fact that the response to market size
235.3 Potential Supply-Side Determinants of Innovation
In this subsection, we investigate the robustness of the baseline results to controlling for po-
tential non-proﬁt determinants of innovation, such as changes in scientiﬁc incentives or oppor-
tunities captured by the δj’s in the theoretical model.
First, recall that the major threat to our identiﬁcation strategy is changes in the δj’s (since
permanent diﬀerences in δj’s are already taken out by our drug category ﬁxed eﬀects). If the
δj’s change over time, they are also likely to be serially correlated. Adding lags of logNct to
our basic speciﬁcations is therefore a simple way to check for the importance of these concerns.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 report the results of estimating a lagged dependent variable
speciﬁcation, by adding a one-period lag of the dependent variable, logNct−1, to our basic
speciﬁcations. In the OLS version, the basic regression therefore changes to:
logNct = α · logMct + ψ · logNct−1 + γ · dct + δc + µt + εct. (28)
Since logNct−1 is correlated with the error term mechanically, estimates to this equation would
be biased, and we deal with this problem by instrumenting logNct−1 with logNct−2.T h i si sa
valid instrument as long as there is no additional autocorrelation in the error term, εct (see, for
example, Blundell and Bond, 1998). This speciﬁcation is also useful more generally to check for
other sources of serial correlation in the entry rate of new drugs (such serial correlation would
make the arguments for the exogeneity of logMct less compelling).
The estimates of α from equation (28), reported in columns 1 and 2, are quite similar to
the baseline. The coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable, logNct−1, is essentially 0 and
insigniﬁcant for ﬁve-year intervals; for ten-year intervals, though signiﬁcant with OLS, it is
again insigniﬁcant with NLLS. These results therefore show that there is no signiﬁcant residual
serial correlation, due to either changes in scientiﬁc opportunities or other sources, and that
controlling for such serial correlation has no eﬀect on our estimates.
A plausible conjecture is that non-proﬁt incentives to develop drugs would be particularly
responsive to opportunities to save lives or cure major illnesses. Motivated by this reasoning,
our second strategy looks at variation in the health beneﬁts of new drugs across categories.
New drugs in our data set include both drugs that are demanded by the consumers but do not
“save lives”, such as Prozac, Paxil, Vioxx, or Viagra, or those that actually save lives such as
heart medicines or cancer treatments (see Lichtenberg, 2003, on the eﬀect of pharmaceutical
innovations on declines in mortality). To investigate this issue, we measure the number of
is 5-10 years before the change in market size, not further in advance. If we include further leads of market
size, these are much smaller and insigniﬁcant. For example, the 15 years lead when included by itself is highly
insigniﬁcant; the NLLS estimate is 1.57 (s.e.=2.52), and the OLS estimate is 1.16 (s.e.=6.06).
24life-years lost corresponding to each drug category using the Mortality Detail Files from the
National Center for Health Statistics from 1970-1994. Following Lichtenberg (2003), for each
death, we subtract the person’s age from 65, then calculate the total number of life-years lost
for all the deaths resulting from diseases related to drugs in each category.31
We add this measure of life-years lost to the right hand side of our baseline regression
models as a proxy for this source of non-proﬁt incentive to undertake research. Since we are
using mortality data prior to 1995, we drop thel a s tt i m ep e r i o df r o mt h er e g r e s s i o n . T h e
baseline regression for the years 1970-1994 is reported in column 3 of Table 5, and leads to
an estimate of approximately the same size as the baseline using all years. Column 4 reports
the result of using the life-years lost variable, and ﬁnds no change in our estimate of α.T h e
coeﬃcient on the life-years lost variable (unreported) is small and insigniﬁcant.32
Starting in column 3, in addition to NLLS estimates in panel A and OLS estimates in panel
B, which use current market size, we also report NLLS estimates with leads of market size in
panel C. These speciﬁcations typically yield results very similar to those in Table 4.
Third, we investigate the implications of diﬀerences in scientiﬁc funding for various drug
categories. Using the Computer Retrieval of Information on Scientiﬁc Projects (CRISP) dataset
(details in the Data Appendix), we construct a variable measuring the total amount of federal
funding for research projects in all drug categor i e s ,a n di n c l u d et h i sv a r i a b l ea sac o n t r o lo n
the right hand side. To the extent that government funding also responds to potential market
size (for example, because drug companies have a greater tendency to apply for funding in
areas where they plan to do research), this variable would be correlated with our market size
measure. In practice, the correlation is low, and columns 5 and 6 show that the inclusion of
this variable, or both its current and lag values, has little eﬀect on our estimates of α.
Fourth, to control for potential trends in scientiﬁc opportunities across drug categories,
we add proxies for pre-existing trends. We construct an estimate for pre-existing trends as
∆c =( l o gNc,60 − logNc,40)/2,w h e r elogNc,60 is the log approvals for category c in 1960 and
logNc,40 is the log approvals in 1940. We then estimate the equation:
logNct = α · logMct +
X
i=80,90
∆c · σi + δc + µt + εct, (29)
where σi’s are dummies for the 1980s and 1990s. This speciﬁcation allows drug categories that
31For example, if someone dies at age 32, this counts as 33 life years lost; people dying older than 65 receive
no weight in this calculation.
Note that the Mortality Detail Files are coded by disease class, so we must convert the classiﬁcation to our
system. Since many of our categories contain diseases or conditions that do not lead to death, we obtain a
number of empty cells.
32We also ran separate regressions using ﬁve- and ten-year lags of life years lost (both unreported), and again
found no change in our estimates of α.
25have grown at diﬀerent rates between 1940 and 1960 to also grow at diﬀerent rates in the 1980s
and the 1990s. Column 7 reports the results of this exercise. The estimate of α is similar to
our baseline estimate, 6.23, with standard error 1.88. Column 8 repeats the same exercise with
∆c =( l o gNc,70 − logNc,40)/3 as the measure of pre-existing trends. The resulting estimate is
again similar to our baseline. These results are perhaps not surprising, since pre-1970 approvals
are considerably noisier, thus only an imperfect control for pre-existing trends.
An alternative, and substantially more demanding, strategy is to include linear time trends.
To do so, we estimate:
logNct = α · logMct + ηC · t + δc + µt + εct, (30)
where c refers to the 34 detailed drug categories, and C refers to the relevant 16 major drug
category, i.e., the one which detailed category c belongs to. We expect technological diﬀerences
to be captured by which of the 16 major drug categories each drug belongs to, since these
categories are based on therapeutic intent, while the subcategories are based on use by age
group. The estimates, reported in column 9, are close to our baseline. For example, with
NLLS, the estimate of α is 5.60 (s.e.=2.10). The OLS estimate is smaller and insigniﬁcant.
Using lead market size instead of current market size results in a similar pattern: the NLLS
estimate, 8.46 (s.e.=2.53), is signiﬁcant at 1 percent, while the OLS estimate (not reported to
save space), 4.99 (s.e.=2.81), is signiﬁcant at 10 percent.
We also investigate the potential eﬀects of advances in biotechnology, such as the use of
recombinant DNA, or other technological changes, during the late 1980s and the 1990s. In
terms of our model, these developments would correspond to changes in the δj’ s .I nc o l u m n1 0 ,
we drop the categories of Cancer and Cardiovascular, which, according to the FDA approval list,
have witnessed the entry of the greatest number of orphan drugs, presumably by biotechnology
ﬁrms. Although, as noted above, our dependent variable does not include these drugs, we also
check whether our results are driven by entry of new drugs in these categories. The estimates
in column 10 are close to those in column 1 of Table 3A, demonstrating that the estimates of
α are not sensitive to dropping these two categories.
In addition, there is anecdotal evidence that biotechnology ﬁrms were ﬁrst active in produc-
ing insulin (the Glucose and Thyroid category) and in the Hematologic category.33 In column
11, we drop these two categories, and again ﬁnd that our results are essentially unchanged.
To assess the role of biotechnology ﬁrms further, we add the approvals of a group of prod-
ucts known as biologics, where biotechnology ﬁrms have been active, to our measure of drug
33Biotechnology ﬁrms were also active in producing human growth factor, but since there are only a small
number of individuals using these drugs in the MEPS and NAMCS, these drugs are not included in our approvals
dataset.
26approvals. These products include some vaccines, blood and plasma related products, and other
products such as interferon and erythroproteins (used for red blood cell production), and are not
included in our baseline measure because they go through a separate FDA regulatory process.
The results of this regression, reported in column 12, show little change in the estimates of α.34
Finally, to see whether the advent of biotechnology or other technological advances of the
past two decades have changed the relationship between market size and entry of new drugs,
we estimated our baseline models including an interaction between a post-1985 (or post-1990)
dummy and market size. Our estimates showed no evidence of signiﬁcant interactions. For
example, in a speciﬁcation parallel to the NLLS model of column 1 of Table 3A, the estimate
of α is 5.24 (s.e.=1.96), and the interaction with the post-1985 dummy is 0.10 (s.e.=0.07), thus
quantitatively very small and insigniﬁcant.
The results in this subsection therefore show that a number of controls for other (non-
market-size related) determinants of the entry of new drugs have little eﬀect on our main
ﬁndings. Although these results are not conclusive on the eﬀect of scientiﬁc or other non-proﬁt
considerations in pharmaceutical research, they suggest that the eﬀect of potential market size
on entry and innovation is relatively robust.
5.4 Changes in Health Insurance Coverage
Our market size measure only exploits changes in potential market size driven by demographic
trends. Another source of variation in market size comes from changes in coverage of drug
expenditure in private or public health insurance programs. Finkelstein (2003), for example,
exploits changes in the coverage of various vaccines to estimate the eﬀect of these policies on
the development of new vaccines.
During our sample period, there were signiﬁcant changes in the coverage of drug expenditure
in health insurance plans. For example, the percentage of 0-20 year-olds with some form
of private health insurance coverage fell from about 73% to 68% between 1974 and 1996,
while the percentage of 60+ year-olds with private insurance rose from 62% to 75% (authors’
calculations from the National Health Interview Survey). Furthermore, there have been changes
in Medicaid eligibility rules, designed to insure more poor children. These changes in health
insurance coverage induce additional changes in market sizes. We now investigate both whether
controlling for this source of variation aﬀects the estimates of the impact of the demographics-
driven potential market size measure, Mct, and whether we can improve our measure of potential
market size by including information on health insurance coverage.
34We also repeated our basic regressions without the categories where biologics are most common, Antivirals
(12), Hematologics (20) and Immunologics (80), with little eﬀect on the estimates of α.
27We use the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS, 1974-1996) to construct the fraction
of each age group covered by a private health insurance plan. Because there is no consistent
information on prescription drug coverage, we assign prescription coverage to any individual
with both doctor and surgical coverage. Prescription drug coverage is highly correlated with
this measure in the years where we can observe it. The NHIS also includes information on
Medicaid and Medicare. Because Medicare does not cover prescription drugs, it enables us to
perform a simple “falsiﬁcation test”.
First, with direct parallel to our Mct measure, we use the NHIS to construct the following




uca · ¯ pa · fat, (31)
where fat is the fraction of age group a in period t with private health insurance, uca is the
expenditure share as described above, and ¯ pa is the sample average income of age group a (in
this section, we always use income-based market size and weights). We use ¯ pa rather than pat
to isolate changes due to drug insurance coverage rather than demographic changes. We then
add log ¯ Hct to our estimating equations (24) and (26).
Column 1 of Table 6 shows that the addition of this variable has no eﬀect on the estimates
of α relative to those in Table 3A, and that our baseline results are robust to controlling for
separate trends in private health-care coverage. For example, in the NLLS speciﬁcation the
coeﬃcient is now 5.21, as opposed to 6.04 in Table 3A. The coeﬃcient on log ¯ Hct itself is
positive, though insigniﬁcant.
Next, we construct alternative measures of log ¯ Hct using Medicaid and Medicare coverage
rates for fat (though all individuals above 65 are covered by Medicare, not all of them take up
the beneﬁts). Not surprisingly, with Medicaid and Medicare, the estimates of α are unaﬀected
and the eﬀect of log ¯ Hct is substantially weaker, presumably because these measures exploit
much less of the variation in actual market size. Columns 4-6 investigate the implications of
adding the ¯ Hct measures in the speciﬁcations with lead market size, and show similar results.
Columns 7-9 take an alternative approach and construct a market size measure incorporating




uca · pat · fat, (32)
where uca, pat and fat a r ea sd e ﬁned above.
Using log e Hct instead of logMct in column 7 leads to a similar coeﬃcient relative to column
1 of Table 3A (4.27 with standard error of 1.24). The diﬀerence in magnitude may be because
28insurance-driven and demographics-driven market sizes aﬀect diﬀerent types of drugs, or be-
cause the demographics-driven changes are anticipated further in advance, potentially enabling
a greater response. The most likely explanation, however, is that e Hct is a worse measure of
market size than Mct because (32) eﬀectively assigns 0 use to those without insurance.35
We next construct an alternative measure of e Hct from information on Medicaid coverage.
Changes in Medicaid eligibility have made children more likely to be covered. In the 1970s,
about 9% of 0-20 year olds were covered by Medicaid; this fraction rose to 17% by the late
1990s. Column 8 shows a very small and marginally signiﬁcant eﬀect of Medicaid insurance on
t h er a t eo fe n t r yo fn e wd r u g s .
Finally, as a falsiﬁcation exercise, we use a measure of e Hct calculated from information on
Medicare take-up rates. Since Medicare does not cover prescription drugs, this measure should
not predict new drug entries (though note that Mct and e Hct are correlated by construction).
Reassuringly, the estimate in column 9 shows no positive eﬀect of Medicare coverage.
5.5 Reverse Causality
Lichtenberg (2003) shows that new drugs have increased the average age at death (and hence, to
a lesser extent, life expectancy) by as much as 1 percent per year. This introduces the potential
for reverse causality whereby the market size for successful drugs may be endogenously larger,
b e c a u s et h e i ru s e r sl i v el o n g e r .W et h i n kt h i si sn o taﬁrst-order concern, since drug-induced
changes in population are likely to be small relative to the demographic changes that we are
exploiting. Nevertheless, we further address this issue by instrumenting for current population
using the corresponding population from 10 years before. For example, we use the population
fraction of 50+ year-olds in 1970 as an instrument for the population fraction of 60+ year-olds
in 1980. The fraction of 50+ year-olds is highly correlated with the fraction of 60+ year-olds
10 years later, but is unaﬀected by new drugs that are developed in the intervening 10 years.
These instrumental-variables (IV) estimates show no evidence of reverse causality. In column
2 of Table 7, we instrument for market size with past market size. With NLLS, the estimate is
5.56 (s.e. =1.69), slightly lower than the non-instrumented estimate for the same time period
reported in column 1. Columns 3 and 4 show the corresponding results using ten-year intervals.
The IV estimates in column 4 give larger coeﬃcients than the corresponding non-instrumented
results, particularly with NLLS, and both are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
35Another possibility is that the eﬀect of demographics-driven market size was somewhat overestimated in
Table 3A because of the correlation between this measure and insurance coverage. However, the estimates in
columns 1-6 in this table suggest that this is not a major concern.
295.6 Results from the NAMCS
The rest of Table 7 repeats some of our main speciﬁcations using data from the NAMCS. This
is a useful exercise because the NAMCS has a more even distribution of users across drug
categories than the MEPS, and also because it starts in 1980, enabling us to check whether use
of drug consumption and expenditure data from the late 1990s introduces any biases. However,
as noted above, the NAMCS is less representative, since the data are reported by doctors in
private practice, whereas the MEPS is a sample of all U.S. households.
Column 5 shows our baseline regression, with the same speciﬁcation as column 3 of Table 3A
(we cannot repeat the speciﬁcations of columns 1 and 2, since the NAMCS does not provide drug
expenditure information). The estimate of α using NLLS, 2.86, is insigniﬁcant and considerably
smaller than the corresponding MEPS estimate. The OLS estimate is also smaller than the
corresponding MEPS estimate, but is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Column 6 uses the
MEPS data with the NAMCS classiﬁcation system, and obtains estimates similar to column 3
of Table 3A. This shows that the disparity between the NAMCS results and Table 3A is not
due to diﬀerences in classiﬁcation systems, but is probably driven by the non-representative
nature of the NAMCS data.36
In column 7, we use ten-year time intervals, and ﬁnd similar results to column 5; the NLLS
is insigniﬁcant while the OLS is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Columns 8 and 9 report
unweighted results, which are larger than the weighted estimates. This contrasts with the
pattern from the MEPS, and is consistent with our conjecture that the diﬀerences between
weighted and unweighted results in the MEPS were largely because of the less precise age
distribution estimates for the smaller categories in that data set (this is not a problem in the
NAMCS, which leads to a more precise estimate of age distribution of users in the smaller
cells).
Finally, we use the NAMCS to investigate whether our reliance on drug use data from the
late 1990s induces any systematic bias.37 We construct an alternative estimate of market size,
M1980
ct , with the use per person numbers, u1980
ca , only from the 1980 NAMCS survey. We then
36Using an alternative market size variable constructed with the fraction of total use for each age group for
uca, rather than use per person for each age group, leads to very similar estimates from the two surveys, which
are also close to the MEPS estimates reported in Table 3A. Although this alternative measure has the advantage
of not being sensitive to the total expenditure by category in NAMCS, the baseline measure we use appears to
be both more natural and theoretically better motivated.
37To see the potential reason for concern, suppose that a Gastrointestinal drug that is a major improvement
over existing drugs enters the market before the ﬁrst year of the MEPS, 1996, and is consequently used by a
large number of 30-50 year-olds for the 1970-2000 period. The drug use and expenditure shares we estimate from
the MEPS for Gastrointestinals would include the use and expenditure of that drug. As a result of the entry of
this successful drug, we may overestimate the importance of Gastrointestinals for 30-50 year-olds. Nevertheless,
this will not lead to spurious positive estimates of the eﬀect of potential market size on entry, since overtime
variation in our measure of market size is still purely driven by demographic changes.
30estimate equations (24) and (26) in the post-1980 sample, instrumenting logMct with logM1980
ct .
For comparison, using our baseline measure only for 1980 onwards with the NAMCS data, we
obtain a NLLS estimate of 4.64 (s.e.= 3.58) and an OLS estimate of 5.76 (s.e.= 4.00) in column
10. Instrumenting with logM1980
ct in column 11 leads to an estimate of α equal to 4.79 (s.e.=
3.98) with NLLS and 6.63 (s.e.= 4.57) with OLS, in both cases similar to the estimate in column
10. This comparison suggests that using microdata from the 1990s to construct rates of drug
u s ei su n l i k e l yt oc r e a t ea n ys i g n i ﬁcant bias.
5.7 Generics vs Non-Generics
Table 8 shows the results of some of our speciﬁcations using only generic drugs to construct
Nct. Table 9 reports similar regressions for non-generics. Because we now look at generics
and non-generics separately, there are more empty cells; for example, using all drugs and ﬁve-
year intervals, there are 9 empty cells, but there are 27 and 24 for generics and non-generics,
respectively. Therefore, in Tables 8 and 9, the NLLS results should be more reliable than the
OLS estimates (but we also report the latter for completeness).
C o l u m n1i nb o t hT a b l e s8a n d9r e p o r t st h eb a s i cs p e c i ﬁcations for ﬁve-year intervals
using the income-based measure of market size, similar to column 1 in Table 3A. For generics,
the NLLS estimate, 7.70 (s.e.=2.69), is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.38 The corresponding
estimate in Table 9 for non-generics, 4.41 (s.e.=1.91), is smaller, though still signiﬁcant at
1 percent. The larger estimate for generics suggests that the entry of generic drugs is more
responsive to market size, but the results also show a signiﬁcant response of non-generics.
Columns 2 and 3 investigate the robustness of this result when we control for serial corre-
lation by including lagged entry on the right hand side and when we control for major drug
category trends (respectively, estimating equations (28) and (30)). The lagged dependent vari-
able is not signiﬁcant and has little eﬀe c to nt h ep o i n te s t i m a t e so fα either with generics or
non-generics, though with generics, the estimate, 8.08 (s.e.= 5.34), is only signiﬁcant at 10 per-
cent. The estimate for non-generics, 4.55 (s.e.= 1.91), continues to be signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
Controlling for linear trends, on the other hand, has almost no eﬀect on the estimates, which
continue to be signiﬁcant at 1 percent in both cases.
Columns 4 and 5 investigate anticipation eﬀects. For generics, when both current and lead
market sizes are entered together, neither market size is signiﬁcant, though the estimate on
38Because the requirements to gain FDA approval for generic drugs changed in 1984 with the Hatch-Waxman
Act, we investigated whether the relationship between potential market size and new drug approvals also
changed. The answer seems to be no. For example, interacting market size with a post-1985 dummy in the
NLLS speciﬁcation, the estimate of α is 7.94 (s.e. 2.71) and the coeﬃcient on the interaction is 0.15 (s.e. 0.08),
i.e., quantitatively very small. There is a large increase in approvals of generics in the late 1980s followed by a
decrease in the early 1990s, which are mostly captured by the time dummies.
31current market size is similar to column 1, while the estimate on lead market size is negative
and small. When lead market size is entered by itself, it is signiﬁcant for ﬁve-year intervals,
thus there might be some limited response of generics to anticipated future market sizes. The
pattern is somewhat diﬀerent for non-generics: lead market size is insigniﬁcant both when
entered together with current market size and when used by itself.39
Columns 6 and 7 of Table 8 investigate the impact of lag market size. When current and
l a gm a r k e ts i z ea r ep r e s e n tt o g e t h e r ,c u r r e n tm a r k e ts i z ei ss i g n i ﬁcant and lag market size has
a negative and insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient. On the other hand, lag market size on its own has
a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on entry of generics in column 7. The evidence is therefore
inconclusive as to whether lag market size matters for generic entry.40 In contrast, in non-
generics regressions lag market size is insigniﬁcant both when entered together with current
market size and by itself, and we do not report these speciﬁcations in Table 9 to save space.
The FDA has labeled some non-generics as priority drugs because they appear to oﬀer sig-
niﬁcant clinical improvement over available products and therapies. The FDA has a second
classiﬁcation, whether or not a drug contains a new molecule (an active ingredient that has not
been marketed before in the U.S.). Research by the National Institute for Health Care Man-
agement (2002) suggests that drugs labeled priority or new molecules (but not both) generate
less revenue than other non-generics, but those that are both priority drugs and new molecules
generate more revenues. To look at the relationship between market size and a potential mea-
sure of more signiﬁcant innovation, we construct a new measure of Nct, which only includes
approvals for drugs that are designated to be both new molecular entities and priority drugs.
In the basic speciﬁcation reported in column 6 of Table 9, we ﬁnd an estimate of 4.06, which
is very similar to the estimate in column 1 but statistically insigniﬁcant because of the large
standard error (3.48). Column 7 looks at the impact of the ﬁve-year lead market size, and
obtains a coeﬃcient estimate of 4.71 (s.e.= 2.79), which is signiﬁcant at 10 percent. Therefore,
these estimates are similar to the estimates from columns 1 and 2, but the standard errors
are considerably larger. Most probably, the signiﬁcantly larger standard errors result from the
presence of many fewer new molecular entities and priority drugs than generics or non-generics
in our data (there are only a total of 190 such drugs in our 1970-2000 dataset).
39We also experimented with longer leads, and obtained similar results. Lack of a signiﬁcant anticipation eﬀect
for non-generics is somewhat surprising, especially given the evidence that there might be some anticipation
eﬀects for generics. This might be because the non-generic results are less precise, making it diﬃcult to detect
anticipation eﬀects. Note also that when we look at priority drugs and new molecules in columns 6 and 7, lead
market size has more predictive power than current market size, but is only signiﬁcant at 10 percent.
40We expected lag market size to matter and generic entry to lag behind non-generics because of patent
protection for non-generics.
325.8 Patents
Finally, we investigate the eﬀect of potential market size on patents. We obtained data on
pharmaceutical patents from Thomson Derwent Inc., and with the help of a specialist at this
company, we mapped these patents into our FDA classiﬁcation system.41 However, the mapping
of patents for chemicals into FDA categories is imperfect and necessarily introduces a signiﬁcant
amount of noise, which makes inference more diﬃcult in this case.
Firms typically apply for a patent prior to the clinical trial stage of drug development, or
about 5-10 years before the drug is approved.42 Given the results so far, we might expect
patents to respond to future demographic changes.
In columns 8 and 9 of Table 9, we estimate equations (24) and (26), except that Nct is now
the number of patents in a particular drug category. The estimates of α are positive and of
similar magnitude to the estimates for non-generics (e.g., 3.12 for current market size and 4.38
for lead market size), but because of the much larger standard errors, they are statistically
insigniﬁcant.43 There may be a number of reasons for the much larger standard errors with
patents.44 First, this may simply reﬂect the imperfect match between the patent data and the
FDA categories, especially bearing in mind the potential use of certain chemical structures in
multiple drug lines. Second, the signiﬁcant costs and uncertainty involved in the development
of new molecules and patentable products may be creating substantial attenuation (e.g., a drug
intended for the 1990s may be patented in the 1980s or 1990s, depending on delays in the
research process). Third, pharmaceutical companies may respond more to proﬁti n c e n t i v e sa t
the later stages of the research process than at the earlier stages. Finally, patents may be
more responsive to OECD demand than to U.S. demand. To investigate this last possibility, we
looked at the relationship between changes in market size derived from European, Japanese and
U.S. demographic changes. In this case, we ﬁnd estimates of the ﬁve-year lead of market size
on patents that are broadly similar to the results for non-generics and statistically signiﬁcant at
5 percent (for example, 4.23 with standard error 1.82 with NLLS and 3.07 with standard error
1.28 with OLS). Although this result suggests that OECD demand may be more important for
patents, we are currently unable to make more progress in distinguishing between these various
41We could not use the data from the Hall-Jaﬀe-Trachtenberg patent dataset (see Jaﬀea n dT r a c h t e n b e r g ,
2002) because we were unable to map their classiﬁcation based on chemical structure to our drug categories.
42The ﬁrm therefore loses a signiﬁcant fraction of the life of the patent before it can begin marketing the
drug. Part of the Hatch-Waxman Act allowed pharmaceutical companies to apply to the FDA for an extension
of the life of their patents, if they could show that they lost marketing time while waiting for approval. The
maximum extension is 5 years, and depends, among other things, on the length of the initial FDA approval
process. Overall, companies have a maximum of 14 years of patent protection after FDA approval.
43We obtain similar results with ten-year or ﬁfteen-year leads of market size.
44Finkelstein (2003) also ﬁnds weaker results for vaccine patents than for later stages of development.
33explanations, and the weaker results for patents remain a puzzle.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates the response of entry of new drugs and pharmaceutical innovation to
changes in potential market size of users, driven by U.S. (or OECD) demographic changes. Our
results indicate that a 1 percent increase in the potential market size for a drug category leads
to approximately 4-6 percent growth in the entry of new drugs approved by the FDA. This
response comes from the entry of both generics and non-generics, though the eﬀect on generics
is larger and somewhat more robust.
This ﬁnding, if further proven to be robust, has important implications both for research
on the pharmaceutical industry, and for the endogenous growth and directed technical change
literatures. It provides evidence that, as conjectured by these models, R&D and technological
change are directed towards more proﬁtable areas. Furthermore, the magnitude of the eﬀect,
which is important for evaluating various theoretical predictions of these models, is substantial.
For example, directed technical change models suggest that the relative demand curves for
factors can be upward, rather than downward, sloping if the development of new technologies
r e s p o n d st oa1p e r c e n ti n c r e a s ei nm a r k e ts i z eb ym o r et h a n1p e r c e n t( s e e ,f o re x a m p l e ,e q u a -
tions (21) and (22) in Acemoglu, 2002)–the corresponding number implied by our estimates is
in the range of 4 to 6. Second, these ﬁndings imply that pharmaceutical research towards drugs
with relatively small markets may be limited, which is a key premise of recent work by Kremer
(2002). Building on this premise, Kremer suggests that there needs to be selective government
incentives for developing drugs against malaria and other third-world diseases.
We view this research as part of a broader investigation of the eﬀects of proﬁti n c e n t i v e s
on innovation. Evidence from a single industry may be nonrepresentative, for example because
the pharmaceuticals may be more research oriented than other industries. Future research
investigating the response of innovation and entry of new products to market size both in speciﬁc
industries and at the economy-wide level is necessary to substantiate the results presented here.
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378 Data Appendix
8.1 Prescription Drug Use and Expenditure, and Drug Categories from the MEPS
The MEPS is an annual survey of randomly sampled households; we use the 1996, 1997 and
1998 surveys. We obtain each person’s age, the name of the prescription drug(s) used, and total
expenditure (there are multiple records for people who use more than one prescription drug).
Over the 3 years, we have about 500,000 drugs used and about 75,000 people. Expenditure
includes out-of-pocket expenses, as well as amounts paid by insurers, collected from surveys
sent to insurance companies.
We begin with the 159 therapeutic categories, obtained from the FDA’s National Drug
Code (NDC) Directory. The names of these categories can be found in the second column of
A p p e n d i xT a b l eA 1 .T h eN D CD i r e c t o r yc o n t a i n saﬁle with the therapeutic category for most
FDA approved drugs currently on the market. We assign each drug in the MEPS to one of the
159 categories by matching it by national drug code with a drug in the NDC ﬁle. We cannot
match about 10 percent of the drugs mentioned in the MEPS; these are usually not commonly
used drugs, and make up less than 5 percent of the total drugs used.
We calculate drug use and expenditure by ten-year age group, using the survey weights.
We divide these by the corresponding population and income for that year and age group, as
estimated from the CPS, to obtain drug use and expenditure per person for each age group
and category. The results are very similar if we construct use per person as a weighted average
of use per person in the survey, i.e., without using CPS information. We prefer the former
methodology because it enables us to construct income-based measures without relying on
MEPS income data.
The FDA has assigned each of the 159 categories to one of 20 major therapeutic categories.
Within each major category, we separate minor categories when there is suﬃcient heterogeneity
in the age structure of drug expenditure (using drug use yields the identical classiﬁcation
system). From Table A1, it is apparent that we separate categories when there is considerable
variation. For example, within Antimicrobials (categories 10-12) category 10 is used more by
0-20 year olds, category 11 has a steadily upward sloping age proﬁle of users, and category 12
is used approximately equally by individuals over age 30.
As noted in the text, we drop four major categories: Anesthetics, Antidotes, Radiophar-
maceuticals, and Miscellaneous. We also drop several minor categories when there are not
suﬃcient observations to estimate a reliable age structure. We use about 1,500 observations
as our cutoﬀ rule. We obtain this number from observing that only categories with more than
1,500 observations have fairly smooth age proﬁles.
Finally, we aggregate the initial ten-year age groups into 5 age groups, 0-20, 20-30, 30-50,
50-60, 60+, since most of our 34 categories show sharp peaks in one of the 5 groups.
388.2 Prescription Drug Use and Drug Categories from the NAMCS
The NAMCS diﬀers from the MEPS in several important ways. First, it covers the years 1980,
1981, 1985, and 1989-2000 (in constructing our classiﬁcation system and estimating drug use,
uca, we aggregate all years of NAMCS data). Second, the survey is based on doctor-patient
visits. It does not cover doctors at institutions or hospitals, unless they are considered to have a
private practice. For each visit in the sample, there is a list of drugs prescribed, with a maximum
of 5 to 8, depending on the year. Since we do not have information on expenditure, we weight
multiple drugs for a single patient equally (as we do in constructing drug use per person with
the MEPS). The survey also contains information on the doctor’s primary diagnosis, but it is
not possible to create a consistent map between drugs prescribed and the diagnosis.
From 1993-2000, the NAMCS provides the FDA category for each prescribed medication.45
We use this information to construct a mapping of medications to FDA class, which we can use
to assign drugs from earlier survey years. Our worst success rate is in 1980, where we matched
about 85% of prescribed drugs; in most years the match rate is well above 90%. Because of
these high rates, we believe that the bias from only using prescribed drugs in earlier years that
were still being prescribed in the early 1990s is not large.
We initially construct drug use per person by ten-year age group as we do with the MEPS.
We obtain 30 drug categories, as shown in Appendix Table A2, which is available upon request.
We ﬁn dt h a tt h es a m e5a g eg r o u p sa r es u i t a b l ef o rt h eN A M C Sd a t a . W eu s et h es a m e
cutoﬀ rule of 1500 observations for the NAMCS as for the MEPS for dropping FDA categories.
Diﬀerent FDA categories are excluded from the two surveys, e.g., Antifungals from the NAMCS
and Anterior Pituitary from the MEPS.
8.3 Drug Approvals from the FDA
We have obtained a list of FDA drug approvals from Frank Lichtenberg. Over-the-counter drugs
and orphan drugs (of which only a few can be matched) are excluded. Moreover, biologics, which
go through a separate approval process, are not in this dataset.
We match drugs in the approval list to FDA categories by drug name. 13,916 of 16,220
prescription drugs (86%) approved since 1970 are matched, while before 1970, the match rate
is about 45%. This motivates our focus on drug approvals between 1970 and 2000. Drugs that
have the same approval number and FDA class as a previously approved drug and drugs for
which the corresponding FDA category is dropped because of insuﬃcient observations in the
M E P Sa r ee x c l u d e d .F i n a l l y ,w ed r o pd r u g sw i t ht h es a m en a m e ,M E P Sc a t e g o r ya n dd i ﬀerent
dosage from a previously approved drug, leaving us with our sample of 6,595 drugs. Of these,
1,928 are non-generics, and 190 are priority drugs and new molecules.
45Several drugs change FDA classes over the 8 years. In most cases, when we construct the 30 categories
t h e s ed r u g ss t a yw i t h i nt h es a m ec a t egory; we drop those that do not.
398.4 CRISP Data
The Computer Retrieval of Information on Scientiﬁc Projects (CRISP) dataset contains fed-
erally funded research projects at universities, hospitals and other institutions. Many of the
grants are for very basic research, so they cover the earliest stages of drug development. The
projects are funded by the National Institutes of Health and the Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration, as well as a variety of other agencies such as the FDA and the
Center for Disease Control and Prevention. We have obtained a dataset with all pojects in the
CRISP database for 1972-1995 from Frank Lichtenberg. In 1995 there were 57,553 grants, for
a total of about 11 billion dollars.
Each record lists the project’s investigator and aﬃliation, and the amount awarded. Most
projects list one or several diseases which the researchers intend to study. For each disease
listed, we know whether it is of primary, secondary or tertiary importance in the project. In
our analysis, we use only primary diseases, and divide the award amount evenly between them.
Our results are not sensitive to alternative weighting schemes.
The disease classiﬁcation system has about 2,900 diseases, though these are arranged in a
heirarchical structure into 35 major disease classes. We map the detailed disease classes into our
classiﬁcation scheme, though there are no matches of primary disease to the ﬁve of the smallest
MEPS-based categories, Contraceptives, Skeletal Muscle Hyperactivity, Vertigo/Motion Sick-
ness, Non-narcotic Analgesics, and Central Pain Syndromes. Our results are not sensitive to
dropping these categories from the regressions.
8.5 Patents
We have obtained patent data from Thomson Derwent Inc. We use all pharmaceutical patents
granted in the United States, between 1970-2000. We use these data instead of the Hall-Jaﬀe-
Trachtenberg patent data because the latter use a classiﬁcation for pharmaceuticals based on
chemical structure, which we are not able to map into our FDA classiﬁcation system. The
Thomson Derwent patents are classiﬁed by chemical structure and therapeutic intent, and a
specialist at the company has mapped this system into the FDA system. Because the mapping
is not precisely one to one, about ﬁve percent of the patents fall into two of our categories,
which we drop. We are left with 275,406 patents. This number is comparable to the number
of pharmaceutical patents in the Hall-Jaﬀe-Trachtenberg patent dataset. Since we were unable
to obtain citations to construct a weighting system, we assign all patents equal weight.
401980/1990 1990/2000 1980/2000
Overall Correlation 0.955 0.878 0.852
Weighted Correlation 0.967 0.862 0.862
Mean Correlation by Drug 0.851 0.778 0.732
1996/1997 1997/1998 1996/1998
Overall Correlation 0.996 0.996 0.992
Weighted Correlation 0.999 0.999 0.997
Mean Correlation by Drug 0.919 0.955 0.902
MEPS/NAMCS MEPS use/MEPS expenditure
Overall Correlation 0.187 0.962
Weighted Correlation 0.360 0.983
Mean Correlation by Drug 0.813 0.853
Notes: Overall correlation is the correlation of use per person (or average expenditure share for expenditure 
cells) across all categories.  In weighted correlations, observations are weighted by total use or expenditure from 
the MEPS or NAMCS. Mean correlation by drug computes correlations separately by drug, then takes the 
average.
Table 1:
Correlations Between Different Drug Use Measures
Panel A: NAMCS over time
Panel C: Correlation Between NAMCS and MEPS, and Between MEPS Use and Expenditure
Panel B: MEPS over timeAge Group 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000
0-20 26.29 26.74 27.43
20-30 25.96 26.61 27.09
30-50 26.32 27.14 28.04
50-60 25.78 26.31 27.11
60+ 25.82 26.58 27.30
Age Group 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000
0-20 6.49 6.33 5.37
20-30 3.81 4.54 3.87
30-50 6.22 6.85 6.23
50-60 5.57 6.22 5.86
60+ 6.22 7.21 6.38
Age Group 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000
0-20 6.32 5.90 3.95
20-30 2.64 3.74 2.89
30-50 6.06 6.68 5.68
50-60 5.33 5.88 5.36
60+ 5.92 6.96 5.81
Age Group 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000
0-20 4.62 5.29 5.09
20-30 3.43 3.95 3.40
30-50 4.34 4.96 5.37
50-60 4.03 4.98 4.91
60+ 4.90 5.71 5.53
Notes: In Panel A, log income by age group is the log of mean income over the ten year interval, from the 
March CPS.  In panels B, C and D each of the 34 drug categories is assigned one age category, based 
on the age group that uses that category most.  See text and Appendix Table A1 for details.  Log of drug 
approvals is the log of the sum of all approvals in the indicated 10 year interval, for all drug categories 
corresponding to the given age category.  
Panel C: Log Drug Approvals of Generics by Age Group, From FDA
Table 2: 
Population by Age Group and Drug Approvals Over Time
Panel A: Log Population by Age Group, From CPS
Panel D: Log Drug Approvals of Non-generics by Age Group, From FDA
Panel B: Log Drug Approvals of All Drugs by Age Group, From FDA(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
6.04 4.95 6.16 5.16 5.51 4.02
(1.95) (1.90) (2.04) (1.84) (1.84) (1.51)
R Squared 0.86 0.91 0.86 0.91 0.75 0.84
4.52 4.65 5.74 5.27 3.41 4.39
(2.00) (2.13) (2.42) (2.21) (1.62) (2.11)
R Squared 0.87 0.92 0.86 0.91 0.80 0.86
Number of Observations 204 102 204 102 204 102
Length of Time Interval 
(Years) 51 051 051 0
Drug Category Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Market Size and Weights 
Include Income Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Counts of drug approvals are computed 
from the FDA dataset of New Drug Approvals, by counting drug approvals for each category over five- and ten-
year intervals (see Appendix for details).  Market Size is obtained by multiplying the time-invariant average 
expenditure share of users in a particular age group, calculated from the MEPS, by total income of that age group 
at that date, from the CPS, and summing over all age groups.  When market size does not include income, use 
per person is multiplied by population.  See text for details.  All regressions include drug and period dummies, 
and the 34 drug categories constructed from the MEPS, as described in the Appendix.  In panel A, the Poisson 
model is estimated by NLLS (with the Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984, transformation).  See equation (26) in 
the text.  In panel B, if a cell is empty, log approval is set equal to zero, and a dummy variable, equal to 1 when 
the cell is empty, is added to the regression; see equation (24).  Regression weights are cell size for the category 
from the MEPS, either total expenditure or total use.  
Log Market Size
Table 3A:
Effect of Changes in Market Size on New Drug Approvals
Panel B: OLS, dependent variable is log drug approvals
Panel A: NLLS for Poisson model, dependent variable is count of drug approvals
Log Market Size(1) (2) (3) (4)
6.25 5.98 6.55 6.23
(0.52) (0.57) (0.67) (0.74)
{1.53} {1.50} {1.81} {1.73}
6.56 6.18 8.58 7.90
{1.74} {1.91} {1.66} {1.70}
5.40 5.11 5.39 5.27
(1.58) (1.70) (2.14) (2.30)
{2.07} {1.64} {2.87} {2.25}
Number of Observations 204 102 204 102
Length of Time Interval 
(Years) 51 051 0
Market Size and Weights 
Include Income Yes Yes No No
Notes: Maximum Likelihood standard errors in parentheses, and Huber-White standard errors in curly brackets.  
Drug approvals, market size variables, and regression weights are constructed as in Table 3A.  All regressions 
include drug and period dummies, and use the 34 MEPS-based drug categories.  In panels A and B the 
Poisson model is estimated using maximum likelihood.  In panel C the negative binomial model is estimated 
using maximum likelihood.  
Panel A: Poisson ML, dependent variable is count of drug approvals
Log Market Size
Table 3B:
Effect of Changes in Market Size on New Drug Approvals
Panel C: Negative Binomial ML, dependent variable is count of drug approvals
Log Market Size
Panel B: Weighted Poisson ML, dependent variable is count of drug approvals
Log Market Size(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
6.04 4.95 13.56 6.50 1.06 5.04
(1.95) (1.90) (4.45) (2.24) (3.97) (1.93)
-6.16 -3.89 3.34 -0.39
(3.15) (2.20) (1.38) (2.24)
7.64 5.01 8.78 8.69
(4.86) (3.65) (2.30) (3.13)
R Squared 0.86 0.91 0.86 0.91 0.86 0.90 0.88 0.96 0.88 0.95
4.52 4.65 8.62 5.67 0.81 5.41
(2.00) 2.13 (3.91) (2.65) (3.35) (2.80)
-3.32 -2.14 2.29 1.34
(2.97) (2.43) (1.47) (2.15)
6.00 4.92 6.84 8.08
(4.39) (5.23) (2.76) (4.67)
R Squared 0.87 0.92 0.87 0.91 0.86 0.91 0.88 0.96 0.88 0.96
Number of Observations 204 102 204 102 204 102 170 68 170 68
Length of Time Interval 
(Years) 51 051 051 051 051 0
Log Market Size
Table 4:
Delays and Anticipation Effects
Panel A: NLLS, dependent variable is count of drug approvals
Notes: Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.  Drug approvals and market size variables are constructed as in Table 3A.  Lag Market Size refers to 
one-period lag of Log Market Size, and Lead Market Size refers to one-period lead of Log Market Size.  All regressions use income-based market size and 
income-based weights.  Regressions include drug and period dummies and all 34 drug categories.  In panel A, the Poisson model is estimated using 
NLLS (with the Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984, transformation), and in panel B empty approval cells are set equal to zero and a dummy variable for 






Panel B: OLS, dependent variable is log drug approvals(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
5.78 6.44 5.28 5.24 5.74 5.72 6.23 6.24 5.60 5.43 5.93 6.32
(1.89) (1.75) (1.76) (1.83) (1.84) (1.83) (1.88) (1.72) (2.10) (1.88) (1.99) (2.11)
0.02 0.52
(0.29) (0.35)
R Squared 0.86 0.92 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.57 0.61 0.49 0.83 0.85 0.85
4.23 5.16 5.00 4.73 4.46 4.68 4.66 4.68 3.23 4.25 4.55 4.66
(1.99) (2.21) (2.18) (2.22) (1.97) (2.26) (2.17) (1.97) (3.33) (2.09) (2.00) (2.04)
-0.43 1.98
(0.42) (0.68)
R Squared 0.87 0.93 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.87 0.89 0.77 0.87 0.86
8.78 8.77 8.78 8.63 9.03 8.36 8.46 8.62 8.76 8.77
(2.30) (2.50) (2.47) (2.43) (2.51) (2.45) (2.53) (2.66) (2.51) (2.47)
R Squared 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.62 0.86 0.88 0.88
Length of Time Interval 
(Years)
5 1 0 5555555555
Life Years Lost No No No Yes No No No No No No No No
CRISP Funding  No No No No Yes Yes No No No No No No
Pre-existing Trends 
Interacted with Period 
Dummies
No No No No No No Yes Yes No No No No
Major Drug Category 
Trends  No No No No No No No No Yes No No No








Panel A: NLLS for Poisson model, dependent variable is count of drug approvals
Potential Supply-Side Determinants of Innovation 
Lead Market Size
Log Market Size
Panel B: Linear Regressions, dependent variable is log drug approvals





VariableNotes to Table 5: Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.  Drug approvals and market size variables are constructed as described in Table 3A.  In 
all regressions, market size is computed using income and expenditure shares.  All regressions include 34 categories, drug and period dummies, and are 
weighted by cell size.  In panels A and B, the number of observation is 204 in columns 1, 5, and 12; 102 in 2, 7, 8, and 9, 170 in 3, 4 and 6; and 192 in 10 
and 11. In panel C, the number of observation is 170 in columns 3, 4, 5, and 12; 136 in column 6; 68 in 7, 8, and 9; and 160 in 10 and 11. In columns 1 
and 2 the lagged dependent variable is instrumented with the twice lagged dependent variable.  Life years lost is defined as the number of years prior to 
age 65 for each death in the US, as calculated from the Mortality Detail Files.  See text for details.  Column 4 includes a count of total life years lost due 
to diseases in the corresponding category and time interval. Columns 5 and 6 include the amount of funding from NIH grants for research in each 
category in each category in the particular interval, as calculated from the CRISP database (see Appendix for details).  Column 6 also includes the lag of  
this variable.  1940/1960 trend for category c is one-half the log difference of drug approvals for category c between 1960 and 1940.  In column 7, the 
1940/1960 trend is interacted with period dummies for the 1980's and 1990's decades.  Column 8 reports the corresponding regressions for the 
1940/1970 trends.  See text for details. The interactions were generally insignificant, and are not reported.  Major drug category trends are linear time 
trends interacted with dummies for the 16 major drug categories.  See text for details. In column 12 FDA approvals of biologics for each category and 
time interval are added to the dependent variable. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
5.21 5.79 5.85 4.27 0.19 -3.05
(2.30) (1.92) (2.04) (1.24) (0.12) (3.36)
7.79 8.10 8.51
(2.72) (3.35) (2.47)
2.59 0.08 -1.68 4.16 -0.35 -5.80
(2.93) (0.12) (3.37) (3.77) (1.23) (4.74)
R Squared 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.85 0.85
3.58 3.98 4.32 3.11 0.25 -2.22
(2.22) (1.99) (2.04) (1.21) (0.08) (2.94)
5.89 6.25 6.65
(2.94) (3.29) (2.77)
2.36 0.20 -1.70 3.48 -0.30 -4.85
(2.38) (0.08) (2.78) (3.48) (1.08) (4.90)
R Squared 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.86
Number of Observations 204 204 204 170 170 170 204 204 204
Length of Time Interval 
(Years) 555555555
Type of Insurance Any Private Medicaid Medicare Any Private Medicaid Medicare Any Private Medicaid Medicare
added to the OLS regression as in Table 3A. 
Notes: Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.  Drug approvals and market size variables are constructed as in Table 3A.  In columns 1-6 log market 
size and lead market size are computed as in Table 3A. Health insurance market size is computed by multiplying the time-invariant average expenditure 
share of users in a particular age group, by average income of that age group for 1970-2000, by the fraction of people in that age group with with the 
corresponding type of health insurance.  In columns 7-9 market size is obtained by multiplying the time-invariant average expenditure share of users in a 
particular age group, by total income of that age group, by the fraction of people in that age group with the corresponding type of health insurance, as 
calculated from the NHIS, and summing over all age groups.  See text for details.  All regressions use income-based market size and income-based 
weights.  Regressions include drug and period dummies and all 34 drug categories.  In panel A, the Possion model is estimated using NLLS (with the 
Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984, transformation), and in panel B empty approval cells are set equal to zero and a dummy variable for empty cells is 









Controlling for Changes in Health Insurance
Panel A: NLLS for Poisson model, dependent variable is count of drug approvals
Log Market Size(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
6.04 5.56 4.95 8.54 2.86 6.18 2.90 4.41 4.60 4.64 4.79
(1.95) (1.69) (1.90) (3.37) (2.04) (2.59) (3.73) (2.49) (2.51) (3.58) (3.98)
R Squared 0.86 0.86 0.91 0.91 0.76 0.83 0.83 0.68 0.78 0.63 0.63
4.52 3.91 4.65 5.96 3.76 6.51 3.96 4.84 6.45 5.76 6.63
(2.00) (2.11) (2.13) (3.94) (1.39) (2.84) (1.95) (1.61) (3.20) (4.00) (4.57)
R Squared 0.87 0.87 0.92 0.92 0.86 0.83 0.93 0.82 0.89 0.90 0.90
Number of Observations 204 204 102 102 180 180 90 180 90 120 120
Number of Categories 34 34 34 34 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Length of Time Interval 
(Years) 5 5 10 10 5 5 10 5 10 5 5
Data Set Used for Market 
Size MEPS MEPS MEPS MEPS NAMCS MEPS NAMCS NAMCS NAMCS NAMCS NAMCS
Instrument for Market Size 
with Previous Market Size No Yes No Yes No No No No No No No
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Instrument Market Size 
with 1980 Based Market 
Size
No No No No No No No No No No Yes
Table 7:
Instrumenting for Market Size and Results Using NAMCS
Notes: Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.  In columns 1-4 and 6, market size is computed as in Table 3A, and is income-based for columns 1-
4.  In columns 5 and 7-11, market size is computed as in Table 3A, except using the NAMCS instead of the MEPS.  In columns 5-11, regressions include 
30 drug categories, constructed from the NAMCS, as explained in the Appendix.  All regressions include drug and period dummies.  Regression weights 
in columns 1-4 are total expenditure of the category, as computed from the MEPS.  Regression weights in columns 5 and 7-11 are total use for the 
category, computed from the NAMCS.  Regression weights in column 6 are total use, computed from the MEPS. In columns 1 and 2, current market size 
is instrumented with the market size 10 years earlier of the age group that is 10 years younger.  For example, the market size of 20-30 year-olds in 1970 is 
instrumented by the market size of 10-20 year-olds in 1960.1980-based market size is constructed in the same way as market size, except that only the 
1980 NAMCS data are used.  In column 11 current market size is instrumented with this variable.
Panel A: NLLS, dependent variable is count of drug approvals
Panel B: Linear Regressions, dependent variable is log of drug approvals
Log Market Size
Log Market Size(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
7.70 8.55 8.08 8.44 14.54







R Squared 0.78 0.72 0.86 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.78
9.03 12.80 8.01 5.68 13.36







R Squared 0.84 0.90 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84
Number of Observations 204 136 204 170 170 204 204
Log Market Size
Panel A: NLLS, dependent variable is count of drug approvals
Lag Market Size
Lag Market Size
Panel B: OLS, dependent variable is log drug approvals
Notes: Hubler-White standardard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables include only approvals of generic drugs.  Market size is the income-
based measure, constructed as in Table 3A.  All regressions include period and category dummies, and are weighted by category size as described in 
Table 3A.  All time periods are 5 years.  Lagged dependent variable is instrumented with twice lagged dependent variable, as in Table 6.
Table 8:







Lead Market Size(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
4.41 4.55 4.49 -3.37 4.06 3.12
(1.91) (1.91) (1.69) (3.30) (3.48) (2.32)
-0.11
(0.17)
5.99 2.61 4.71 4.38
(4.10) (2.28) (2.79) (3.10)
R Squared 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.80 0.88 0.94
1.97 3.50 2.29 -1.01 1.03 2.27
(1.78) (2.00) (1.90) (2.99) (1.43) (1.47)
-0.69
(0.67)
1.93 0.89 -0.70 2.52
(4.05) (2.25) (2.07) (1.76)

















Number of Observations 204 170 170 204 204 204 102 204 170
Notes: Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.  Dependent variables in columns 1-5 include only approvals of non-generic drugs.  Dependent 
variables in columns 6 and 7 include drugs that the FDA has designated as both priority and new mocecules, as described in the Appendix.  Patents 
counts for the dependent variable in columns 8 and 9 are computed from the Derwent Inc. patent dataset, by counting patents for each category over ten-
year intervals (see Appendix for details). Market size is the income-based measure, constructed as in Table 3A.  All regressions include period and 
category dummies, and are weighted by category size as described in Table 3A.   All time periods are 5 years.  Lagged dependent variable is 





Panel B: OLS, dependent variable is log drug approvals or patents
One Period Lead Market 
Size




Non - Generics and Patents: Effect of Changes in Market Size on Innovation
One Period Lead Market 
SizeClass Description 0-20 20-30 30-50 50-60 60+
Age Group with 
Peak Share of 
Use
0.61 0.30 0.38 0.44 0.45
10 (0.40) (0.09) (0.26) (0.10) (0.16)
0.02 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.12
(0.11) (0.13) (0.31) (0.14) (0.30)
0.03 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.07
(0.16) (0.08) (0.43) (0.15) (0.18)
0.00 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.43
(0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.12) (0.75)
0.05 0.10 0.69 2.68 6.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.19) (0.65)
0.01 0.04 0.16 0.27 0.41
(0.02) (0.04) (0.23) (0.38) (0.33)
0.08 0.19 0.57 0.70 0.57
(0.06) (0.07) (0.46) (0.18) (0.23)
0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
(0.46) (0.07) (0.35) (0.09) (0.04)
0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.75) (0.04) (0.09) (0.03) (0.08)
0.03 0.08 0.24 0.52 0.83
(0.03) (0.04) (0.27) (0.19) (0.47)
0.01 0.01 0.13 0.67 1.37
60 (0.01) (0.00) (0.12) (0.21) (0.66)
0.06 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.13
(0.20) (0.16) (0.27) (0.12) (0.25)
0.05 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.24
(0.13) (0.06) (0.29) (0.14) (0.38)
0.02 0.38 0.34 1.30 0.67
(0.02) (0.13) (0.26) (0.33) (0.26)
0.02 0.10 0.35 1.02 1.70
(0.01) (0.03) (0.22) (0.21) (0.54)
0.01 0.21 0.10 0.01 0.01
(0.06) (0.47) (0.42) (0.02) (0.03)
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
(0.08) (0.09) (0.33) (0.14) (0.36)
(Share of Use in Parentheses)
0-20
Appendix Table A1:
















































20-30Class Description 0-20 20-30 30-50 50-60 60+
Age Group with 
Peak Share of 
Use
0.09 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.17
(0.25) (0.26) (0.27) (0.12) (0.11)
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
(0.18) (0.07) (0.27) (0.11) (0.37)
0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.34) (0.11) (0.49)
0.05 0.11 0.26 0.29 0.27
101 (0.08) (0.08) (0.44) (0.16) (0.23)
0.00 0.01 0.05 0.16 0.17
(0.02) (0.03) (0.25) (0.27) (0.44)
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.41
(0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.08) (0.86)
0.06 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.16
(0.23) (0.09) (0.22) (0.11) (0.36)
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0-20
(0.30) (0.07) (0.22) (0.14) (0.27)
0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.13
(0.12) (0.05) (0.24) (0.13) (0.47)
0.09 0.29 0.59 0.89 1.13
140 (0.05) (0.08) (0.35) (0.17) (0.35)
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07
(0.06) (0.03) (0.32) (0.17) (0.43)
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.14
(0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.19) (0.68)
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.15) (0.10) (0.45) (0.15) (0.15)
0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.37) (0.12) (0.37)
0.20 0.14 0.22 0.47 0.66
(0.20) (0.07) (0.23) (0.16) (0.35)
0.15 0.20 0.29 0.45 0.41
(0.17) (0.10) (0.33) (0.17) (0.24)
0.07 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08




Appedix Table A1 (cont.)
91 Topical Steroids
100 Extrapyramidal Movement
Skeletal Muscle Hyperactivity, 
Anticonvulsants
110 Oncolytics






























Notes: Construction of the 34 categories is described in the Data Appendix. Each category includes the indicated 
FDA sub-categories. Use per person is the mean number of drugs in the class used per person in the age group.  
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Log Approvals Residuals
Log Approvals Residuals Fitted values
Figure 5: Approvals Residuals vs Market Size Residuals
Notes: Log approvals residuals and log market size residuals are residuals from OLS regressions of log
approvals and log income-based market size on category and time dummies, weighted by expenditure
with five year intervals. Fitted values are predicted log approvals residuals obtained from OLS
regression in Table 3A Panel B, column 1.